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The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years:
Contemporary scholars of the free speech clause of the First Amend-
ment generally trace its modern development from the Espionage Act'
passed shortly after the United States entered World War One. They
regard the resulting cases2 as the first important judicial decisions,
and the articles and book published by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., from
1918 through 19203 as the seminal legal scholarship. Chafee's writ-
* Copyright ( 1981 by David M. Rabban. My interest in searching for a First Amend-
ment tradition before World War One grew out of courses taught by Yosal Rogat and
Gerald Gunther at Stanford Law School in 1973 and 1974. Both professors placed great
emphasis on the first Espionage Act cases and especially on the importance of Judge
Learned Hand's decision in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917), as a doctrinal alternative to the Supreme Court opinions written
by Justice Holmes in March 1919. See Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Mod-
ern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975).
Yosal Rogat also pointed out some of the similarities between several of Justice Holmes'
prewar decisions and his Espionage Act opinions. Professors Rogat and Gunther thereby
questioned the prevailing assumption that Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919),
marked the beginning of First Amendment adjudication. After taking their courses, I
thought it likely that the turbulent history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries had produced other cases and had provoked legal scholarship on the First
Amendment that also preceded Schenck.
I owe my greatest debt to Gerald Gunther, who encouraged my interest in undertaking
this research when neither of us knew what, if anything, I might find. For many years
and in countless ways, he has supported my efforts to develop my original seminar paper,
The Meaning of the First Amendment in the Generation Before World War One (May
31, 1974) (unpublished seminar paper, Stanford Law School), cited in Gunther, supra,
at 723 n.14.
Andrew Lipps has read every draft of every manuscript I have written on this topic
and has had many useful suggestions throughout. His willingness to read sections of
a manuscript as soon as I completed them kept me on track and provided invaluable in-
tellectual companionship during the lonely process of writing. Jonathan Knight and Jamie
Kalven made exceptionally detailed and helpful criticisms of the long manuscript from
which this article has been extracted. I am also grateful for the substantive written and
oral comments I have received about the long manuscript from Jerold Auerbach, Mary
Gray, Andrew Irving, Staughton Lynd, Walter Metzger, Paul Murphy, Philip Pomper,
William Van Alstyne, and Robert Webb. Erika Chadbourn, Curator of Manuscripts and
Archives, Harvard Law School Library, has been an excellent guide to the Brandeis,
Chafee, and Holmes Papers.
A fellowship awarded by Project '87, jointly sponsored by the American Historical
Association and the American Political Science Association, allowed me to spend four
months as a guest at the Brookings Institution, where I did most of the work on this
article. Francis Rosenberger and Philip Argetsinger, the Director and Assistant of Project
'87, did much to make my fellowship productive. I also thank James MacGregor Burns
and Richard B. Morris, the cochairmen of Project '87, for the personal interest they
have taken in my research.
1. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2388(a) (1976)).
2. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); see ESPIONAGE ACT CASES
(W. Nelles ed. 1918) (excerpts from federal district and circuit court opinions).
3. Z. CHAFEE, FREE o OF SPEECH (1920); Chafee, A Contemporary State Trial-The
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ings were prompted by and concentrated on the highly controversial
Espionage Act prosecutions and decisions. Although he devoted some
attention to the origins and early history of the First Amendment,
Chafee essentially ignored the years between the Sedition Act of
1798 and the Espionage Act of 1917.4
For decades, scholars and judges accepted Chafee's interpretation
of First Amendment history. In 1960, however, Leonard Levy wrote
Legacy of Suppression, which effectively challenged Chafee's liber-
tarian understanding of the original meaning of the First Amend-
ment.5 Scholars have also refuted the libertarian connotation Cha-
fee ascribed to the phrase "clear and present danger" in the opinion
Justice Holmes wrote in Schenck v. United States, one of the first
Espionage Act cases decided by the Supreme Court.0 More recently,
Gerald Gunther has stressed the importance of Judge Learned Hand's
earlier opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten,7 decided the
month after Congress passed the Espionage Act. But the period be-
tween 1798 and 1917 has remained inadequately explored.
Some historians have investigated particular free speech issues be-
tween the ratification of the First Amendment and World War One.
United States Versus Jacob Abrains Et Al., 33 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1920); Chafee, Freedom
of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Chafee-Free-
dom of Speech in war Time]; Chafee, Freedom of Speech, 17 Nrw REPUBLIC 66 (1918)
[hereinafter cited as Chafee-Freedom of Speech].
4. See Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 945-47 (framers in-
tended to abolish common-law crime of sedition); id. at 944 (prewar cases too few and
varied to define boundary between protected and unprotected speech). In an introduc-
tory "bibliographical note," Chafee made an understatement that remains true more than
sixty years later. He observed that "[t]he history of freedom of speech in America has not
yet been fully investigated." Chafee cited only one historical work, a history of freedom
of the press in Massachusetts to 1827. Id. at 933 n.l. But see id. at 938-42 (passing refer-
ences to several decisions before World War One).
5. L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPPESSION (1960). In his "revisionist" interpretation, Levy re-
luctantly concluded that the framers did not intend to abolish the common-law crime
of seditious libel and that the Bill of Rights reflected "political expediency" rather than
"principled commitment to personal liberties." Id. at vii-viii. Nor did the framers intend
to "supersede the common law by repudiating the Blackstonian concept that freedom of
the press meant freedom from prior restraint" or to abolish "the power of government
to punish words that do not directly incite to acts in violation of law." Id. at x. Levy
argued that Chafee and others " 'anticipated the past' by succumbing to an impulse to
recreate it so that its image may be seen in a manner consistent with our rhetorical tra-
dition of freedom, thereby yielding a message which will instruct the present." Id. at
2-3; see Letter from Leonard Levy to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 12, 1958) (Felix Frankfurter
Papers, Box 76, Library of Congress) ("liberals had been playing .. . fast and loose with
skimpy evidence"). Contra, Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendinent", 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.124; Anastaplo, Book
Review, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1964).
6. 249 U.S. 47 (1919); see p. 580 & note 357 infra.
7. Gunther, supra note *; see 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
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They have studied the Sedition Act of 1798,8 controversies over the
mailing of antislavery literature before 1860,9 the treatment of dis-
senting speech during the Civil War,10 the development of academic
freedom in the United States," and the "free speech fights" by the
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in the early twentieth cen-
tury. ' - But none of these studies treats judicial or scholarly com-
mentary on the First Amendment in detail, and no scholar has made
a comprehensive attempt to generalize about the theoretical or prac-
tical meaning of the First Amendment 3 during any period between
1798 and 1917.14 The impression left by Chafee and reinforced by
8. See, e.g., L. LEVY, supra note 5, at 237-48, 258-308; J. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM
(1951); J. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETERS (1956); Berns, Freedom of the Press and the Alien
and Sedition Laws: A Reappraisal, 1970 Sup. CT. Rrv. 109; Carroll, Freedom of Speech
and of the Press in the Federalist Period; Tile Sedition Act, 18 MicH. L. REV. 615 (1920).
9. See, e.g., C. EATON, THE FREEDOM-OF-THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH 196-215
(rev. ed. 1964); R. NYE, FETrERED FREEDOM 41-85 (rev. ed. 1963); W. SAVAGE, THE CONTRO-
VERSY OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLITION LITERATURE, 1830-1860 (Ist ed. 1938).
10. E. M. COULTER, THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, 1861-1865, at 501-06 (1950);
J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 74-95, 176-79, 477-510, 520, 526-28
(rev. ed. 1951).
11. R. HOFSTADTER & IV. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE
UNITED STATES (1955); see H. BEALE, A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF TEACHING IN AMERICAN
SCHOOLS (1941).
12. See, e.g., M. DUBOFSKY, WE SHALL BE ALL 173-97 (1969); 4 P. FONER, HISTORY OF
THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 172-213 (1965). See generally W. PRESTON,
ALIENS AND DISSENTERS 35-62 (1963). David Montgomery contends that the direct action
techniques of the IWW were "the main theme of a dozen years of fierce class conflict
in America" between 1909 and 1922 and that "'the customary image of the IWW as
representing conduct and aspirations far removed from the 'mainstream' of American
labor development may be misleading." D. 'MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA
91, 100 (1979).
Recent scholarship has provided important insights into broader relationships between
labor agitation and free speech in the decades before World War One. For illuminating
discussions of the cultural and economic background of the street demonstrations that
accompanied strikes and lockouts during this period, see H. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE,
AND SOCIETY IN INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA 63-66 (1976), and D. MONTGOMERY, supra, at 101-05.
These authors also emphasize the relationships between the local balance of power and
the treatment of workers' free speech claims. See H. GUTMAN, supra, at 248-54; D. MONT-
GOMERY, supra, at 59, 160. Montgomery concludes that local enforcement of vague ordi-
nances prohibiting trespass and disorderly conduct had a more significant impact on the
success of picketing and strikes than court injunctions or legislation. Id.
13. This article uses the term "First Amendment" generally to refer to issues and
cases that the modern reader would recognize as relating to freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press.
14. There has, however, been some published discussion of the legal treatment of
free speech issues during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., L.
WHIPPLE, THE STORY OF CIVIL LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1927) (recounting in rough
historical sequence from 1776 to 1917 episodes of public intolerance and governmental
repression of minorities, without analyzing judicial doctrine regarding free speech); An-
derson, The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory, 1870-1915, 24 AM. J. LEGAL
HIsT. 56 (1980) (focusing on restrictive municipal ordinances and briefly discussing aca-
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subsequent scholars thus persists, and analysis of the modern devel-
opment of free speech doctrine still generally begins with the Es-
pionage Act litigation.15
There was, in fact, a marked increase in legal analysis of the First
Amendment in the years following World War One. There were
more prosecutions, more judicial decisions, and more scholarly ar-
ticles and books. Perhaps of greatest importance, World War One
and its aftermath made a greater number of influential people sen-
sitive to First Amendment concerns.' 6
This postwar activity, however, did not spring from a void. Dur-
ing the generation that preceded World War One, the consequences
of industrialization led to substantial social unrest and radical ac-
tivity. The industrial violence associated with the Homestead and
Pullman strikes in the 1890s, the fear of anarchists generated by the
Haymarket riot of 1886 and revived by the assassination of Presi-
dent McKinley in 1901, the nativist response to mass immigration,
and the notoriety of the IWW and Emma Goldman in the early
1900s are among the best known examples.' 7 It is not surprising
that this turbulent period tested the legal meaning of free speech.
The subsequent neglect of the prewar years has left a distorted view
of the social and intellectual history of the First Amendment.'8
demic debate); Roche, Civil Liberty in the Age of Enterprise, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 103
(1963) (general discussion of civil rights of racial and religious minorities, socialists, and
trade unionists).
15. Only a few scholars have tried to account for the assumed absence of First Amend-
ment interpretation over such an extended period. See, e.g., IV. BERNS, THE FIRST AMEND-
.MENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEIOCRACY 147-48 (1976) (no federal libel statute
since 1801 and no federal jurisdiction over common-law crimes since 1812); J.W. HURST,
LAw AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 31-32 (1956) (America in nineteenth century "ex-
alted individual liberty" in abstract, manifested no "substantial, defined hostility to indi-
vidual political freedoms," but reacted with indifference or impatience to any distraction
from economic growth); P. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 248 (1972)
(except for 1798 Sedition Act, no federal legislation and few state statutes limited free
specch); Roche, supra note 14, at 103-04 (American political thought before twentieth
century defined civil rights in "essentially majoritarian fashion as safeguards against
oppressive governmental action," not as "minority rights").
16. See, e.g., D. JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FREEDOM1,S 194-98 (1963) (study
of World War I and rise of American Civil Liberties Union); P. MURPHY, WORLD WAR
I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1979).
17. See R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER (1967). See generally Thomas, Nationalizing
the Republic, 1890-1920, in B. BAILYN, D. DAVIS, D. DONALD, J. THOMAS, R. WIEBE, &
G. WOOD, THE GRrAT REPUBLIC 827-978 (1977) (general textbook treatment of period).
18. The prewar period is particularly intriguing because it immediately precedes the
time when serious attention to the First Amendment is commonly thought to originate.
The existence of scholarly and judicial encounters with free speech claims in the gen-
eration before World War One also suggests that it would be fruitful for contemporary
scholars to examine earlier periods of American history for evidence of an older First
Amendment tradition that may have been lost.
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Scholarship and judicial decisions before the war often foreshad-
owed and influenced subsequent developments in ways that the post-
war civil libertarians never fully understood and occasionally mis-
represented. In the decades prior to Schenck, a rather wide range
of free speech cases, including several arising out of radical activity,
did reach the Supreme Court. Some referred directly to the First
Amendment. Others raised questions that courts today would rec-
ognize as free speech issues, although the Supreme Court, and some-
times even the litigants, often did not identify them as such. A few
scattered hints of doctrine emerged from this litigation, particularly
judicial reliance on the possible "bad tendency" of speech as a jus-
tification for penalizing it. The Supreme Court, with one minor
exception, uniformly found against the free speech claimants. De-
cisions by other courts were generally as restrictive, although some
did support free speech.
Legal scholarship before the war also explored the meaning of
freedom of expression, often in remarkably sophisticated terms and
often with considerable concern for the importance of free speech
to the individual and to society. Important scholars such as Thomas
Cooley, Ernst Freund, Roscoe Pound, and Henry Schofield analyzed
these issues before Zechariah Chafee, Jr., entered the field. Theodore
Schroeder, the principal figure in the Free Speech League, an im-
portant precursor of the American Civil Liberties Union, wrote ex-
tensively on freedom of expression during this period.' 9 These schol-
ars strongly criticized the prevalent judicial insensitivity to free speech.
19. The Free Speech League, founded in 1902 and incorporated in 1911, was the
leading defender of free speech prior to World War One. The League was an informal
organization consisting of a few intellectuals and professionals who lived in New York
City. Its members dedicated themselves to protecting freedom of expression for all groups
and in all contexts at a time when almost all Americans, including the future leaders
of the American Civil Liberties Union and other postwar civil libertarians, were gen-
erally unconcerned about this issue. Most of the information available on the League
is contained in the private papers of Theodore Schroeder, its most important member.
Schroeder's papers are located in the Library of Southern Illinois University at Carbon-
dale. Other active members of the League included the well-known journalists Hutchins
Hapgood and Lincoln Steffens, and Gilbert E. Roe, a former law partner of Senator
Robert M. LaFollette and a practicing attorney who handled many free speech cases,
including Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), State v. Boyd, 86 N.J.L. 75, 91 A. 586
(Sup. Ct. 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 87 N.J.L. 560, 94 A. 807 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915),
People v. Sinclair, 86 Misc. 426, 149 N.Y.S. 54 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1914), Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917), and Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), see pp. 534-36, 545-47, 582-84, 588 n.415 infra (discussing
those cases).
The Free Speech League has received little attention. But see P. MURPHY, supra note
15, at 19-20, 31, 291-92. The few works that even mention it usually identify the League
inconectly as nothing more than the organizational identity for Schroeder's personal
520
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The decisions of the Supreme Court in cases brought under the
Selective Draft Law and the Espionage Act, both passed in 1917,
extended the prewar judicial tradition of hostility to First Amend-
ment claims. But Chafee's articles and book, relying heavily on the
prewar scholarship, advocated an alternative, libertarian construction
of the First Amendment. Chafee skimmed over the cases before World
War One and misread Schenck, a decision essentially consistent with
the prewar tradition that Holmes' own earlier opinions had helped
to establish.
The Supreme Court's majority decisions in the 1920s continued
to apply the bad tendency doctrine to reject First Amendment claims.
But Justices Holmes and Brandeis, who had written the unanimous
opinions in the first group of Espionage Act cases in March 1919,
began to dissent in Abrams v. United States,20 decided eight months
later. In their dissents, Holmes and Brandeis incorporated many of
the libertarian doctrines advocated by Chafee in Freedom of Speech
in War Time, an article published after Schenck but before Abrams
in the June 1919 issue of the Harvard Law Review. They also fol-
lowed Chafee's incorrect interpretation of "clear and present dan-
ger" and continued his neglect of the prewar cases, steps that helped
conceal the significant doctrinal innovations they were promoting.
In the 1930s, the Supreme Court majority2 ' began to accept many
of the libertarian values expressed in the earlier dissents by Holmes
and Brandeis. Through this process, many ideas of the prewar schol-
ars became part of modem First Amendment doctrine, while the
earlier tradition of judicial hostility to free speech was conveniently
forgotten.
efforts. See, e.g., D. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 195; Auerbach, Introduction to T. SCHROE-
DER, "OBSCENE" LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at v, xi (reprint ed. 1972); The
Reminiscences of Roger Baldwin 114 (1954) (Oral History Collection, Columbia Univer-
sity); D. Brudnoy, Liberty's Bugler: The Seven Ages of Theodore Schroeder 144-45, 193,
195, 216 (April 1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Brandeis University Library).
In a forthcoming article on the Free Speech League, I intend to demonstrate the range
and importance of its activities as well as its crucial link to Roger Baldwin during the
formative years of the American Civil Liberties Union.
The most comprehensive account of Schroeder's life and work is found in an unpub-
lished dissertation. D. Brudnoy, supra. See also Domayer, Theodore Schroeder: A Bio-
graphical Sketch, in THEODORE SCHROEDER, A COLD ENTHUSIAST 1-4 (R. McCoy ed. 1973)
(on file with Yale Law Journal); H. Hapgood, A Cold Enthusiast (1913) (pamphlet on
file with Yale Law Journal). Schroeder is discussed in several autobiographies by people
who knew him, including the illuminating reminiscences of Roger Baldwin, supra, at
113-15.
20. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
21. See, e.g., Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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I. Free Speech Before the Courts
Scholars generally assume that courts were not asked to resolve
free speech issues until Congress passed the Espionage Act in 1917.22
No major casebook on constitutional law highlights a First Amend-
ment decision before 1917, and few casebooks even refer to any prior
free speech developments.23 The force of this common assumption is
emphasized by the fact that, in the very process of revising the First
Amendment tradition, two preeminent legal scholars still begin their
analyses with the Espionage Act litigation.
2 4
Scores of decisions reported from all levels of the judicial system
in the generation before World War One demonstrate that this as-
sumption is incorrect. These cases arose in a striking variety of fac-
tual contexts. Many grew out of the social unrest of the period:
workers, anarchists, socialists, and religious minorities produced much
of the free speech litigation before the war. But cases involving edi-
tors and publishers, businessmen, movie distributors, candidates for
22. See, e.g., W. BERNS, supra note 15, at 148 (first free speech case reached Court in
1919); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 578 (1973) ("A corpus of law about
free speech was first seriously constructed in the period of and after the First World
War."); P. MURPHY, supra note 15, at 4 (*In America, freedom of speech had been an
operational reality largely outside the area of either legal definition or restriction from
the adoption of the Bill of Rights until World War I .... "); Chafee, Thirty-Five Years
with Freedom of Speech, 1 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1952) (until beginning of World War
One, meaning of First Amendment "remained conjectural"; no "authoritative judicial
interpretation" before 1917) [hereinafter cited as Chajee-Thirty-Five Years]; Emerson,
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTE'MP. PROB. 648, 652 (1955) (Court did
not "begin to explore the implications of the constitutional guarantee for freedom of
expression" until Espionage Act prosecutions); Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 Ass.
BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 647, 693-94 (stating that Court development of First Amend-
ment doctrine began with Espionage Act cases, but cites prewar treatise, state court de-
cision, and L.R.A. annotation); Gunther, supra note *, at 722 ("[a]ccording to the tra-
ditional view of the intellectual history of the first amendment, . .. all high points of
the formative years" occurred between summer of 1918 and spring of 1921). See generally
D. KENNEDY, OVER HERE 84, 86 (1980) (historical study of domestic effects of World War
One). But see note 14 supra (citing studies of prewar period).
23. See, e.g., E. BARRETr, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1122-31 (5th ed. 1977); P. BREST, PRO-
CESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 146-54 (Supp. 1977); P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND,
M. HOWE, & E. BROWN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1130-31, 1137 (4th ed. 1977); G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1118-37 (10th ed. 1980); P. KUPER & F.
BEYTAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1151, 1154-56 (5th ed. 1980); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR,
& J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 650-65 (5th ed. 1980). One casebook, 1 N. DORSEN, P.
BENDER, & B. NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER, AND DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES (4th ed. 1976), briefly discusses several of the prewar Supreme Court
cases analyzed in this article, id. at 28, 31, and contains a useful section on the history
of free speech in the United States before World War One, id. at 20-39.
24. Gunther, supra note *, at 722 (stressing Masses Publishing Co., decided by Hand
in summer 1917); Kalven, Professor Ernst Freund and Debs v. United States, 40 U. CHI.
L. REV. 235, 236 (1973) (First Amendment law originates in Debs as well as Schench in
1919). Gunther does briefly summarize "the practical and doctrinal climate of the times,




political office, and government employees also brought First Amend-
ment issues to judicial attention. These decisions provide fascinating
proof that litigation about freedom of expression is not just a rela-
tively recent phenomenon.
The overwhelming majority of prewar decisions in all jurisdic-
tions rejected free speech claims, often by ignoring their existence.
No court was more unsympathetic to freedom of expression than the
Supreme Court, which rarely produced even a dissenting opinion in
a First Amendment case. Most decisions by lower federal courts and
state courts were also restrictive, although there were some notable
exceptions. Radicals fared particularly poorly, but the widespread
judicial hostility to the value of free speech transcended any indi-
vidual issue or litigant.
This pervasive hostility did not emerge from a coherent theoreti-
cal framework. The cases were as doctrinally sparse as they were fac-
tually diverse. Like many decisions in all areas of the law before
World War One, these First Amendment cases typically invoked for-
mal pieties at the expense of rigorous analysis,25 thus precluding the
interchange and criticism necessary to the evolution of doctrine. At
the same time that they issued platitudes about the importance of
First Amendment values, judges failed to recognize free speech claims.
Even when the courts addressed the free speech issues presented,
they generally resolved them on an ad hoc basis. Courts rarely went
beyond the facts of a particular case to articulate fundamental prin-
ciples of interpretation. As Chafee pointed out, "[n]early every free
speech decision ...appears to have been decided largely by intui-
tion,"'- 3 and the intuitions of conservative judges rarely supported
freedom of expression.
The absence of systematic judicial thought makes it difficult to
divide the prewar cases into analytical categories, but some generali-
zations are possible. Opinions constantly reiterated that the First
Amendment and analogous provisions of state constitutions do not
25. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 38-40 (1960) (identifying and
describing "formal style" of appellate decisions during this period). Writing about this
"age of faith," Gilmore concludes,
the judges, like the professors, rarely, if ever, bothered with the facts of the cases
they cited or with the reasons why the cases had been decided as they had been. Nor
did the judges make any attempt to explain the reasons for their decisions. It was
enough to say: The rule which we apply has long been settled in this state (citing
cases). Indeed, it was improper, unfitting, unjudicial to say more. The juice of life
had been squeezed out; the case reports became so many dry husks. Stare decisis
reigned supreme.
G. GILMORE, THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAW 63 (1977).
26. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 945.
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protect "license" or the "abuse" of speech. Using this rationale with-
out defining the boundary between "free" speech and "license" or
"abuse," courts routinely restricted speech in public places and de-
veloped the labor injunction. Courts also punished libel, obscenity,
and "indecent" publications, pointing out that the First Amendment
did not abolish preexisting liability at common law. Many decisions,
including an important Supreme Court opinion by Justice Holmes,
followed Blackstone's conclusion that free speech precludes prior re-
straints, but permits the punishment of publications, regardless of
truth, for their tendency to harm the public welfare.2 7 In striking
contrast to their increased oversight of economic and social legisla-
tion, judges gave great deference to the "police power" 8 of legis-
lators and administrators to determine the tendency of speech. Judges
also readily found that speech, even if not directly prohibited, had
a tendency to produce an action proscribed by statute and there-
fore could be penalized as a violation of the more general law.
The judicial landscape, however, was not unrelievedly bleak. A
few Supreme Court opinions contained some fragments of theory
and hints of a more tolerant attitude toward freedom of expression.
In addition, a minority of state and lower federal courts provided
substantial protection for free speech, and several evaluated the mean-
ing of the First Amendment with extraordinary care and sophisti-
cation, even by more recent standards.
The very existence of the prewar cases requires a reevaluation of
the intellectual history of the First Amendment. These cases reveal
that the crucial postwar decisions, from which current analysis gen-
erally begins, continued an established pattern of hostility to First
Amendment concerns. This tradition had to be ignored or repu-
diated in order to create the modern libertarian interpretation of the
First Amendment. The following pages reconstruct the prior lost tra-
dition by examining the Supreme Court cases and a selection of cases
based on state law that implicated free speech in the generation be-
fore World War One.
A. Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court's prewar decisions confined First Amendment
protection to a relatively narrow range of cases. During this period,
27. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see notes 86 & 299 infra (Black-
stone's formulation of freedom of speech).
28. Freund defined the "police power" as "the power of promoting the public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." E. FREUND, THE POLICE
POWER at iii (1904).
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the Court refused to apply the First Amendment to state action, found
no First Amendment concerns in statutes restricting the use of the
mails, simply ignored free speech issues in some cases, and held that
certain categories of expression did not constitute "speech." On those
relatively few occasions when it directly addressed the meaning of
the First Amendment, the Court uniformly upheld restrictions on
speech. Only a few opinions contained signs of a more generous in-
terpretation of the value of free speech and the scope of the First
Amendment.
1. Avoiding First Amendment Issues
A number of cases during the generation before World War One
gave the Supreme Court opportunities to confront free speech issues.
By a variety of methods, the Court usually avoided addressing the
content and meaning of the First Amendment.
Resisting Incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. By de-
clining until 1925 to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment incor-
porated First Amendment prohibitions, the Supreme Court limited
the availability of federal courts to consider free speech claims.2 9 In
1875, the Court quickly thwarted the potential of an earlier circuit
court decision3 0 by holding, in United States v. Cruikshank, that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to legislate against
infringements of free speech and assembly by private citizens.3' Cruik-
shank left open the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tected First Amendment freedoms against state action,3 2 but the Court
29. Beginning with its identification of liberty of contract in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897), the Court expanded the meaning of the liberty clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to declare social legislation unconstitutional. But not until Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), did the Court hold that freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are protected by this clause. See Warren, The New "Liberty" Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431 (1926).
30. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282), sustained the
indictments, under the federal Enforcement Act of 1870, of a mob of whites for un-
lawfully conspiring against a political meeting of black Republicans with intent to vio-
late their rights of free speech and assembly. Judge Woods, who was later appointed to
the Supreme Court, held that the Fourteenth Amendment extended First Amendment
protections against states and empowered Congress to legislate if states failed to protect
these rights against abridgment even by private parties. Id. at 81.
31. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). Cruikshank, which also involved indictments under the En-
forcement Act, was decided before any court cited Hall approvingly. The Court held
that the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment did not surrender to Congress the
police power the Constitution had reserved to the states, id. at 552, and therefore added
"nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another," id. at 554.
32. Id. at 554. The Court asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented "an
encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which belong to every citizen
a- a member of society," without identifying whether the contents of the First Amendment
were fundamental. It suggested that citizens have a constitutional right, perhaps pro-
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did not take advantage of subsequent opportunities to resolve this
question before World War One.
In 1887, the Court found that no federal questions were raised
by the convictions of anarchists found guilty of aiding and abetting
murder because a fatal bomb exploded in Haymarket Square while
they were advocating anarchist doctrine and distributing literature.
33
As a result, it did not address the anarchists' contentions that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the entire Bill of Rights and
that their convictions unconstitutionally deprived them of free speech.
34
Twenty years later, Justice Holmes' majority opinion in Patterson
v. Colorado sustained the contempt conviction of a newspaper editor,
but expressly left "undecided the question whether there is to be
found in the Fourteenth Amendment a prohibition similar to that
in the First. ' 35 These decisions probably discouraged potential liti-
gants from raising free speech claims in the federal courts, and most
likely induced counsel in some cases to frame what were actually
free speech issues in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment and other
constitutional guarantees.36
Excluding Publications from the Mails. In a series of cases sanc-
tioning the exclusion of publications from the federal mails, 37 the
Supreme Court examined the First Amendment somewhat more close-
ly. Yet this closer look did not produce protective results. Using the
rationale that Congress has no power to prevent the private circu-
lation of publications, the Court sustained federal control of the postal
power against challenges based on the First Amendment.
In Ex parte Jackson,38 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
federal statute that prohibited the mailing of lottery advertisements.
Justice Field's majority opinion acknowledged that Congress, in ex-
ercising its power "to establish post-offices and post-roads," may not
tected even against private abridgment, to assemble to petition Congress about matters
"connected with the powers or the duties of the national government," id. at 552, but
stated that freedom to participate in a "meeting for any lawful purpose whatever" did
not qualify for the same protection, id. at 553.
33. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887), aff'g Spies v. People, 122 111. 1, 12 N.E. 865
(1867). The anarchists claimed that they had been punished for "mere general advice"
intended to change the existing order of society. 123 U.S. at 139.
34. 123 U.S. at 166.
35. 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Dissenting, Justice Harlan contended that freedom of
speech and press were protected as privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States and as liberties under the due process clause. Id. at 464-65.
36. See, e.g., pp. 530-31, 534-35, 538, 542 & note 91 infra (discussing briefs in Supreme
Court cases).
37. See generally J. PAUL & M. SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP 31-37 (1961).
38. 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
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"interfere in any manner with the freedom of the press."3 9 It also
recognized that liberty of publication has no value without liberty
of circulation; if Congress could block all avenues of communication,
freedom of the press would suffer a "fatal blow." Yet Congress, the
opinion reasoned, has no power to prevent the circulation, through
private channels, of matter it excludes from the federal mails. 40 Deny-
ing lotteries and obscene material access to the mails, it asserted, is
therefore not an unconstitutional interference with freedom of the
press, but rather a legitimate refusal by Congress to use "its facilities
for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public mor-
als." 4 1 The Court did not discuss the viability of alternative means
of circulation.
In a subsequent case, In re Rapier,42 brought against newspapers
containing lottery advertisements, counsel for the petitioner warned
that the rationale used in Ex parte Jackson would permit Congress
to act as "official censor of public morals. ' 43 A political party in con-
trol of government, counsel argued, could "resolve to silence the jour-
nals of its adversaries" by enacting a law "that ... all utterances which
dispute its tenets and policy are hostile to the public interests and
morals," and therefore should be excluded from the mails. 44 The
Court's decision, however, essentially reiterated the prior discussion
in Ex parte Jackson .4  In an elliptical response to counsel's argu-
ment, Chief Justice Fuller concluded his opinion by stating that the
danger of abuse of power "furnishes no grounds for a denial of its
existence, if government is to be maintained at all."'46 Ex parte Jack-
son, In re Rapier, and subsequent caseS' 7 thus gave judicial approval
39. Id. at 732-33.
40. Id. at 735.
41. Id. at 736. In dicta, the Court specifically approved the Comstock Act, ch. 258,
§ 2, 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976)), which excluded from
the federal mails all publications of an "obscene" or otherwise "indecent character." The
Comstock Act did not itself define obscenity. Cf. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351
(1971) (upholding constitutionality of contemporary codification of Comstock Act). See
generally J. PAUL & M. SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 17-24, 27-28, 252-62; Paul, The Post
Office and Non-Mailability of Obscenity: An Historical Note, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 44 (1961).
412. 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
43. Argument of Hannis Taylor upon a Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus and
Certiorari at 48.
44. Id. at 49.
45. 143 U.S. at 133-35.
46. Id. at 135. The government's brief, after referring to petitioner's warning that the
postal power might be extended to exclude from the mails newspapers espousing speci-
fied political opinions, used language very similar to the quoted phrase of Fuller. Ad-
ditional Brief of Assistant Attorney-General Maury at 15.
47. See, e.g., Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904). In Coyne, the
Court further expanded governmental control over the mails by upholding the con-
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to federal censorship over the mails. Legislation initially excluded
lotteries and obscene material, but in 1917 the Espionage Act added
treasonable and seditious language to the list of prohibited subject
matter.4
8
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan49 presented the Court with re-
lated issues. Congress historically had provided lower postal rates to
newspapers and magazines in order to encourage " 'the dissemination
of current intelligence.' ""0 As a condition for these rates, a 1912 statute
required newspapers and magazines to label paid advertisements and
to furnish information regarding ownership, managerial and edi-
torial personnel, and circulation.51 Appellants attacked this statute
as unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. They claimed that
the First Amendment prohibits all restrictions on the press "either
by anticipation through a licensing system or retrospectively by ob-
struction or punishment," except in matters of "recognized morality"
and common-law libel.5 2 If the Court upheld this statute, one of the
briefs asserted, Congress could also deny mailing privileges or impose
severe penalties "with respect to any newspapers owned or financially
influenced by individuals advocating certain public questions or the
policies of political parties." 53 The Court rejected the publishers'
stitutionality of the Postmaster General's statutory authority to refuse to deliver all mail
addressed to a company conducting a business that he considered to be a lottery or a
fraud. Id. at 506-11. Neither the appellant nor the Court discussed any First Amendment
questions.
48. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 12, §§ 1, 2, 40 Stat. 217 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1717 (1976) (prohibiting mailing of "matter advocating or urging treason, insurrection,
or forcible resistance" to any federal law)).
49. 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
50. Id. at 302 (quoting report of Commission on Second-Class Mail Matter). At the
time of the Lewis Publishing Co. litigation, the rate for letters was eighty times higher
than the rate for newspapers; the profits from letter mail subsidized the losses from
newspapers. Id. at 304. Previous cases had upheld decisions by the Postmaster General
refusing to classify material as newspapers or magazines. See Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne,
194 U.S. 106 (1904); Houghton v. Payne, 194 U.S. 88 (1904). But see 194 U.S. at 110
(Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Fuller, CJ.); 194 U.S. at 100 (same).
51. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 539.
52. 229 U.S. at 292; see Brief for Appellant, Lewis Publishing Company, at 32-36
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. The publishing company also argued that the
statute was designed to regulate journalism rather than to supervise the mails and there-
fore could not be sustained under the postal power. 229 U.S. at 298; see Brief for Ap-
pellant, supra, at 23.
53. Brief of Counsel for Appellant, The Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bul-
letin, at 38-39, Journal of Commerce & Commercial Bulletin v. Burleson, 229 U.S. 288
(1913) (brief submitted in case consolidated with Lewis Publishing Co.). Although the
brief writer assumed that "no one would attempt to uphold the right of Congress to
so legislate," id. at 39, the Solicitor General proved him wrong. The government's brief
maintained that if views held by the owner, including political theories, "are expressed
in the paper Congress can doubtless exclude them, just as Congress could now exclude
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arguments against the statute.54 It held that the same interest in "the
dissemination of knowledge of current events" that had prompted
Congress to establish lower rates for second-class mail also justified
the new requirements. 5 The Court emphasized that its decision did
not involve "any general regulation of what should be published in
newspapers" or any absolute exclusion from the mails, but only the
conditions for a publisher "to continue to enjoy great privileges and
advantages at the public expense."' 6
Later decisions under the Espionage Act, however, substantiated the
concern that Congress might deny lower rates to punish newspapers
publishing unpopular political views. Postmaster General Burleson
revoked the second-class rates for the Milwaukee Leader in 1917 be-
cause, in his opinion, strongly antiwar articles in that newspaper vio-
lated the recently passed Espionage Act. In United States ex rel. Mil-
waukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson5T the Supreme
Court upheld his action, provoking a lengthy dissent by Justice Bran-
deis and a separate dissent by Justice Holmes. 5 The Milwaukee
Leader case incorporated Lewis Publishing Co. into the line of de-
cisions, inaugurated by Ex parte Jackson, that used the content of a
publication as the basis for restricting access to the federal mails.
Neglecting First Amendment Issues. In other cases, the Supreme
Court did not even discuss free speech issues that the modern judge
would clearly identify. In Davis v. Massachusetts, for example, the
all papers advocating lotteries, prohibition, anarchy, or a protective tariff if a majority
of Congress thought such views against public policy." Brief for the United States at
46-47, Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
54. The statute's disclosure requirements remain in force today. See 39 U.S.C. § 3685
(1976).
55. 229 U.S. at 315-16. The statutory requirements, the Court pointed out, would
disclose the financial interests that might influence the reporting of news. Because the
low postal rates gave newspapers an "influence unequaled in history," the public has
the right to know this information. Id. at 312.
56. Id. at 316. The Court concluded its opinion by making clear that "we do not wish
even by the remotest implication to be regarded as assenting to the broad contentions
concerning the existence of arbitrary power through the classification of the mails, or
by way of condition embodied in the proposition of the Government." Id.; see note 53
supra (quoting government contention to which Court apparently referred).
57. 255 U.S. 407 (1921).
58. Id. at 417-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 436-38 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In
his dissent, Brandeis cited the Solicitor General's brief in Lewis Publishing Co. as an
illustration of "(h]ow dangerous to liberty of the press would be the holding that the
second-class mail service is merely a privilege, which Congress may deny to those whose
views it deems to be against public policy." Id. at 431-32. Quoting the concluding remarks
in Lewis Publishing Co., see note 56 supra, Brandeis suggested that the Court had not
adopted the Solicitor General's view. 255 U.S. at 432 n.1; cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc.,
327 U.S. 146, 157 (1946) (Postmaster General may not require positive contribution to
"public good or public welfare" for literature or art to qualify for second-class rates).
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Court upheld a Boston city ordinance that prohibited public ad-
dresses "in or upon any of the public grounds . . . except in ac-
cordance with a permit from the mayor." 9 Davis, a minister, asserted
that the ordinance established an unjustified censorship and "vio-
late[d] the rights of free public speech, of free assembly, and of free
public religious worship." 60 He also objected to the mayor's "Pon-
tifical and Princely Power to Dispense with the prohibition."'6 He
alleged that the municipal authorities, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment, enforced the ordinance solely against preachers of the
gospel and ignored the many other men in public life who had given
speeches on the common without obtaining a permit. 62 The Supreme
Court sustained the ordinance without addressing Davis' First Amend-
ment or equal protection claims. "For the legislature absolutely or
conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park,"
the Court reasoned in language taken verbatim from Justice Holmes'
opinion below, "is no ,more an infringement of the rights of a mem-
ber of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid
it in his house."0 3 The Court also decided that the mayor's power to
exclude anyone from public grounds necessarily included the lesser
power to issue permits for their use.
64
59. 167 U.S. 43, 44 (1897).
60. Brief of James F. Pickering, for Plaintiff in Error, at 4, Davis v. Massachusetts,
167 U.S. 43 (1897) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff in Error]. The brief claimed
that the city's purported justifications, the dangers of breaches of the peace and damage
to the public grounds, were "most improbable and never threatened." Id. at 45. The
Attorney General of Massachusetts responded by maintaining that the First Amendment
protects "freedom as to substance, rather than as to place." Brief of Defendant in Er-
ror at 10.
61. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 60, at 45.
62. Id. at 19. Davis' counsel cited Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and other
cases protecting Chinese immigrants from discriminatory municipal ordinances. Brief
for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 60, at 48-52. He argued that as an American citizen
and a preacher of the gospel, he deserved the same equal protection as alien Chinese.
Id. at 50. Davis' counsel also cited cases permitting parades by the Salvation Army to
support his equal protection claim. Id. at 55-61.
63. 167 U.S. at 47 (citing Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113,
113 (1895)). Justice Holmes' famous epigram in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892), foreshadowed his decision in Davis and was
another example of the low priority he generally gave speech. Upholding the dismissal
of a police officer for violating a regulation forbidding solicitation of money for po-
litical purposes, Holmes stated, "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." See Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439,
1439-40 (1968).
64. 167 U.S. at 48. But cf. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 514-16 (1939) (opinion of
Roberts, J.) (invalidating municipal ordinances abridging right to use streets and parks
to discuss and to distribute leaflets about public issues; Davis v. Massachusetts not con-
trolling); id. at 533 (Butler, J., dissenting) (relying on Davis).
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In Ex parte Curtis,06 the Supreme Court also neglected First Amend-
ment claims when it upheld the constitutionality of a statute forbid-
ding employees of the United States to solicit or receive from each
other money or property for political purposes. The petitioner pro-
tested that the statute, "under the banner of 'reform!'," gave a "deadly
stroke" to freedom of expression. "[F]reedom of speech and of the
press is abridged," he contended, "if every citizen cannot, at will, con-
tribute to cause the speech to be made, in a suitable place; and, when
made, that it may be disseminated, to accomplish the 'political pur-
pose' for which it is intended." He could not imagine a "more se-
vere blow at free discussion."6 6 The majority of the Court, however,
had no such difficulty. It viewed the statute simply as a constitu-
tionally legitimate means to the valid legislative ends of promoting
efficiency, integrity, and discipline among public servants.17
In other cases that today would be recognized as raising First Amend-
ment issues, counsel also ignored potential free speech claims. For
example, in Halter v. Nebraska3 the Supreme Court sustained a Ne-
braska statute that prohibited the use of the United States flag in ad-
vertisements but not in newspapers or magazines. The defendants
attacked this statute on a variety of constitutional grounds, but neither
their brief nor the Court's opinion mentioned freedom of speech or
"commercial" speech.09 Similarly, in Rosen v. United States,70 which
affirmed a conviction for mailing obscene literature, the appellant and
the Court focused on the specificity of the indictment under the Sixth
Amendment without examining the standard applied by the lower
court to define obscenity. 7'
Limiting the Meaning of Speech. At times, the Supreme Court con-
sidered free speech claims only to deny that the alleged constitu-
tional violations involved speech. In Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
65. 106 U.S. 371 (1882); see Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287, § 6, 19 Stat. 143 (current
version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 602-603 (Supp. III 1979) (forbidding government employees to
solicit political contributions from colleagues or to make contributions to employers)).
66. Brief for the Petitioner at 28-29. The government's brief dismissed this claim
as "not . . . worthy of very serious attention." Brief for the Government at 12.
67. 106 U.S. at 373; cf. note 198 infra (citing cases upholding restrictions on political
activity by federal employees).
68. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
69. Among other arguments, the defendants maintained that the statute deprived
them of property without due process, Brief for Plaintiffs in Error at 49-55, and denied
them equal protection by regulating only advertisements, id. at 55-59. For Justice Harlan's
rejection of these contentions, see 205 U.S. at 42-46. But see note 272 infra (discussing
cases holding "commercial speech" protected by First Amendment).
70. 161 U.S. 29 (1896).
71. Id. at 42-43 (discussing roles of jury and judge in determining whether material is
obscene under Hicklin test, see p. 548 infra, without reference to freedom of expression).
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Co.,7 2 the president of the American Federation of Labor asserted that
an injunction was unconstitutional because it ordered the union not
to publish or otherwise state that the company was on the union's
"Unfair" and "We don't patronize" lists. 73 Conceding that a legis-
lature could punish the publication at issue, Gompers denied that
courts of equity had authority to impose by injunction a prior re-
straint on speech.74 The Court refused to discuss the First Amendment
question, holding without explanation that "the general provisions
of the injunction did not, in terms, restrain any form of publica-
tion." 75 The opinion went on to imply a distinction between normal
speech, which is protected by the First Amendment, and "verbal acts,"
which have "a force not inhering in the words themselves," and which
are "as much subject to injunction as the use of any other force
whereby property is unlawfully damaged." When speech becomes a
means for accomplishing an unlawful purpose-in Gompers, a union
boycott conspiring in restraint of trade-it is no longer speech but
a "verbal act."7 This distinction, which foreshadowed modem de-
bate over the alleged distinction between speech and conduct, 77 proba-
bly explains why the Court did not consider the injunction a for-
bidden prior restraint. The First Amendment prohibits only prior
restraints upon speech and, under the Court's analysis, "verbal acts"
are apparently a form of conduct.
The Court limited the meaning of speech in a different context
in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio.78 The ap-
pellants attacked, as a prior restraint in violation of the free speech
provision of the Ohio Constitution, a state law that required approval
of all films by a board of censors before exhibition. The briefs of
both parties, atypically for this period, concentrated on free speech
72. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
73. Id. at 420 n.1 (text of injunction).
74. Brief for Appellants at 12-13, 26. Gompers cited Justice Holmes' decision in Pat-
terson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), see pp. 533-34 infra, to support his claim that
the injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication. supplemental and
Reply Brief for Appellants at 18.
75. 221 U.S. at 436-37.
76. Id. at 439.
77. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 64 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-74 (1942); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 60-61 (1966); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FPREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-Gov-
ERNMENT 42-43 (1948).
78. 236 U.S. 230 (1915). The Court's jurisdiction apparently derived from appellants'
claim that the state statute "imposes an unlawful burden on interstate commerce," id.
at 239, a claim the Court quickly rejected, id. at 240-41.
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arg-uments. 79 The brief of the Ohio Attorney General is especially
revealing because it recognized the potential First Amendment con-
cerns lurking in prior Supreme Court cases decided on other gToundss °
The Supreme Court began with generalities about the certainty, value,
and breadth of "freedom of opinion and its expression," asserting
"'that opinion is free and that conduct alone is amenable to the
law.' "81 But after invoking these pieties, the Court promptly rejected
the appellants' argument that films are "publications of ideas" de-
serving the same constitutional protection as other publications. The
Court found this position inconsistent with "common sense" and
"judicial sense." 2 According to the Court, the exhibition of films
was simply a profitmaking business and should not be regarded "as
part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion."sa
2. Addressing First Amendment Issues
In a number of cases brought in the generation before Schenck,
the Supreme Court found itself confronted with First Amendment
claims that could not be avoided so easily. The Court underlined
its insensitivity to the value of free speech by uniformly rejecting
all of them. The decisions stated or assumed that speech could be
penalized if it had a "bad tendency" upon the public welfare.
Justice Holmes and the Bad Tendency of Speech. Two of Justice
Holmes' opinions before Schenck focused explicitly on the supposed
"bad tendency" of speech. In Patterson v. Colorado,4 he upheld a
contempt conviction for criticizing judicial behavior, without afford-
ing the offending editor an opportunity to prove truth as a defense.
The First Amendment, Holmes declared, prevents all "previous re-
straints upon publications," but allows "the subsequent punishment
of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare . . . . The
79. Brief of Appellants, Mutual Film Corporation and The Mutual Film Company,
at 11-62, Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) [herein-
after cited as Brief of Appellants]; Brief of Appellees at 16-32, Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellees].
80. Citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911), and two cases
prohibiting the use of the mails for lotteries, In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892); Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), the brief asserted that these cases would necessarily have
considered free speech issues "if such liberties are as broad as claimed by the appellants
in this case." Brief of Appellees, supra note 79, at 25; see id. at 25-28.
81. 236 U.S. at 243 (quoting unidentified source).
82. Id. at 243, 244.
83. Id. at 244. But see Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952)
(motion pictures are "significant medium for the communication of ideas"; Mutual Film
disapproved).
84. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
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preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the
subsequent punishment may extend as well to the true as to the
false."85 Holmes believed that this rule, developed in the context
of the common law of criminal libel and summarized by Black-
stone,86 is particularly applicable to contempts of court. Publica-
tions criticizing judicial behavior in pending cases, he pointed out,
"tend to obstruct the administration of justice," whether or not the
allegations are true.sT
Fox v. Washington,88 decided eight years after Patterson, gave
Holmes another opportunity to consider the relationship between
the bad tendency of speech and crime. Fox challenged the constitu-
tionality of a Washington statute that made it a gross misdemeanor
to publish, edit, or circulate written matter "in any form, advocat-
ing, encouraging or inciting, or having a tendency to encourage or
incite the commission of any crime, breach of the peace or act of
violence, or which shall tend to encourage or advocate disrespect
for law or for any court or courts of justice."8 9 The plaintiff in error
was convicted under this statute for editing an article entitled "The
Nude and the Prudes," which predicted and encouraged a "boycott"
against those who interfered with nude bathing in the community.
0
Gilbert Roe's brief attempted to distinguish Fox from the many
cases upholding statutes that punished "language naturally tending
to produce" crimes such as breach of the peace and assault and bat-
tery, and from cases sustaining statutes that prohibited sending ob-
85. Id. at 462. Holmes assumed for purposes of argument that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment might incorporate First Amendment prohibitions. See p. 526 supra.
86. In the section of his Commentaries cited by Holmes, 205 U.S. at 462, Blackstone
defined criminal libels as writings "of an immoral or illegal tendency" and considered
them a subcategory of crimes, such as "challenges to fight," that tend to provoke breaches
of the peace. Thus, "the provocation, and not the falsity, is the thing to be punished
criminally." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CO1MENTARIES *150. Blackstone went on to discuss pre-
vious restraints. Id. at *151-52, quoted in note 299 infra. Although Holmes also relied
on those sections, see pp. 533-34 supra, he did not include them in his reference to Black-
stone. Holmes added citations to Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304
(1826), and Respublica v. Oswald, I Dall. 319 (Pa. 1788), two early state libel cases that
followed Blackstone.
87. 205 U.S. at 462. Holmes added that the definition of contempt was a matter of
local law for the state court to decide as long as there was no showing that "innocent
conduct has been laid hold of as an arbitrary pretense for an arbitrary punishment."
Id. at 461.
Patterson has been cited to support the proposition that the First Amendment pro-
v'ides greater protection against prior restraints than against subsequent punishments.
See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 714 (1931).
88. 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
89. Id. at 275-76.
90. Id. at 276-77.
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scenity through the mails. In all these situations, Roe maintained,
"[t]he character and causes of the prohibited act are known, and it
is possible to determine with some degree of certainty, what lan-
guage induces the commission of such act." In Fox, by contrast, "the
mental state of the reader or hearer described as 'disrespect for law'
is the ultimate fact to be produced by the use of the language pe-
nalized, and who can say what language will produce that state of
mind?" 91
Holmes wrote the opinion sustaining Fox's conviction. He stressed
that the decision of the Court had "nothing to do with the wisdom
of the defendant, the prosecution, or the act. All that concerns us
is that it cannot be said to infringe the Constitution of the United
States. ' -9 2 With evident discomfort and without really responding
to Roe's argument, Holmes strained to limit a statute he did not like.
He rejected the argument that the act was "an unjustifiable restric-
tion of liberty and too vague for a criminal law." Holmes contended
that, "by implication at least," the state court had "read the statute
91. Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error at 15, Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915) [here-
inafter cited as Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error]. Roe's brief concentrated on demonstrating
the vagueness of the statute, a theme stressed in Theodore Schroeder's writings, see p. 577
& note 346 infra, and also alleged that the statute deprived Fox of the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error, supra, at 15-17. Roe
referred to the First Amendment only in two sentences at the end of his brief. He
reminded the Court that Patterson v. Colorado raised, but did not decide, the issue of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied the First Amendment to state action, and
pointed out that the record in Fox preserved that question. Id. at 17. He concluded the
brief simply by reiterating his view that the Fourteenth Amendment alone was sufficient
to reverse Fox's conviction. Id.
It is somewhat surprising that Roe, a major figure in the Free Speech League, did not
use this opportunity to raise First Amendment claims, especially because he viewed this
case, among the many that came to his attention, as a particularly promising vehicle
for a useful decision from the Supreme Court. Letter from Gilbert E. Roe to Theodore
Schroeder (Dec. 31, 1912) (Theodore Schroeder Papers, Box 10, Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Library). Roe might have rationally concluded, based on the Court's prior decisions,
that it would be unsympathetic to First Amendment claims. Yet Holmes in Patterson
had produced one of the Court's few prewar holdings on the meaning of the First Amend-
ment. Holmes might also have addressed First Amendment claims in Fox if Roe had
presented them. And even if Holmes' reactions to the libertarian views of Roe and the
Free Speech League had been as unresponsive to the value of free speech as his opinion
in Patterson, Fox, like Patterson, might have provoked a substantive dissent.
92. 236 U.S. at 278. Whatever his views on the merits of a law, Holmes generally up-
held legislation against constitutional attacks. This approach accounts in large part for
his dissents in substantive due process cases and for his misleading reputation as a lib-
eral. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a case that applied "liberty of contract"
to invalidate a state statute limiting working hours, Holmes also denied that his personal
views on the merits of legislation had constitutional significance. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Holmes noted in Lochner that the Post Office, among other institutions, in-
terferes with the liberty of the citizen. Id. Gilmore and Rogat have stressed the deference
Holmes gave to dominant political majorities. See G. GILMORE, supra note 25, at 48-50,
66-67, 131 n.36; Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHi. L. Rv. 213, 253-55 (1964).
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as confined to encouraging an actual breach of law."93 He found it
unlikely that the statute would be "construed to prevent publica-
tions merely because they tend to produce unfavorable opinions of
a particular statute or of law in general."94
In Fox, "the disrespect for law that was encouraged was disre-
gard of it-an overt breach and technically criminal act."9 The of-
fensive article, Holmes found, "by indirection but unmistakably...
encourages and incites a persistence in what we must assume would
be a breach of the state laws against indecent exposure.""" He noted
that even without statutory prohibitions such statements, "if directed
to a particular person's conduct, generally would make him who ut-
tered them guilty of a misdemeanor if not an accomplice or a prin-
cipal in the crime encouraged." Holmes acknowledged that Fox's
article was directed to "a wider and less selected audience," but he
added, as if to dispose of this problem, that "[liaws of this descrip-
tion are not unfamiliar."
97
Review of Statutes Penalizing Speech. During this period, the Court
also upheld convictions under two other statutes that directly pe-
nalized speech. Although neither statute imposed prior restraints or
criminal penalties, both restricted individual rights as a result of
prohibited advocacy. The Court in these cases also seemed to apply
the bad tendency rationale.
In Turner v. Williams,98 an anarchist who was. a British alien
challenged his pending deportation under the Alien Immigration
Act of 1903, which excluded "anarchists, or persons who believe in
or advocate the overthrow by force or violence of the Government
of the United States or of all government or of all forms of law, or
93. 236 U.S. at 277. "It would be in accord with the usages of English," he reasoned,
"to interpret disrespect as manifested disrespect, as active disregard going beyond the




97. Id. at 277-78. But cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (state may
not "forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action"); Wechsler, Jones, & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate
Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation,
and Conspiracy, 61 COLum. L. Rav. 571, 626-27 (1961) (to prevent legitimate agitation
from being misinterpreted as solicitation to crime, Model Penal Code, though apparently
not First Amendment, requires solicited conduct to be "specific"); id. at 622 n.295 (citing
several cases decided in generation before World War I that addressed relationship be-
tween speech and crime).
98. 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
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the assassination of public officials."09 Turner was arrested following
a lecture in New York City, during which he had predicted a gen-
eral strike throughout the industrial world, discussed its probable
local effects, and stated that, "as an anarchist, as one who believes
that the people should emancipate themselves, I look forward to this
struggle as an opportunity for the workers to assert the power that
is really theirs." This lecture, and a list of proposed lecture topics
found on Turner when he was arrested, constituted the evidence that
formed the basis for his pending deportation. 00
In their brief for Turner, financed by the Free Speech League,' 0°
Clarence Darrow and Edgar Lee Masters stressed that "[a]narchists
are distinguished by a definite creed and not by the means proposed
to propagate the creed or render it paramount." They argued that
anarchists do not necessarily believe in or advocate the overthrow
of government by force or violence and therefore are not, solely by
definition, guilty of violating the act. 0 2 Darrow and Masters also
pointed out that no evidence against Turner indicated that he per-
sonally urged the use of force or violence. 10 3 To deport him, they
concluded, would violate the First Amendment. At a more general
level, Darrow and Masters asserted that "[t]he fundamental basis of
free opinion demands that convictions shall be freely spoken to the
end that the truth shall be known. Upon this freedom all progress
depends."'
04
These arguments did not convince the Supreme Court. The ma-
jority asserted that if Congress defined an anarchist as one who sup-
99. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, §§ 2, 38, 32 Stat. 1213 (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(28)(A)-(B), (F)-(G) (1976) (omitting direct reference to belief in anarchist doc-
trine)).
100. 194 U.S. at 283. His proposed lectures included "The essentials of anarchism" and
"The legal murder of 1887." Id. The latter referred to the executions of the defendants
in the Haymarket bombings. Id. at 294; see p. 526 supra.
101. See 1 E. GOLDMIAN, LIVING MY LIFE 348 (1931); Letter from E.B. Foote, Jr., to
"Dear Sir" (March 5, 1904) (Theodore Schroeder Papers, Box 6, Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Library).
102. Brief and Argument of Appellant at 36.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 49. The brief also cited Freund's treatise, id. at 47; see E. FREUND, supra
note 28, at 509-10; pp. 572-73 infra. The government's brief, written by future Supreme
Court Justice McReynolds, called Turner's First Amendment claims "incomprehensible."
Brief for Appellee at 21. The brief's treatment of this issue reveals its general hostility to
free speech, particularly for aliens. "Abridgment of the freedom of speech or of the
press," it contended, "is no more brought about by the exclusion or expulsion of anar-
chibts than by similar treatment of the followers of Confucius." The brief added that
"the right to talk is no more sacred than the right to work" and pointed out that not
all alien workers could be admitted. The statute, rather than violating the First Amend-
ment, protected the country from aliens seeking to overthrow the government. Id. at 22.
The Court did not refer to this portion of the government's brief.
The Yale Law Journal
ports the violent overthrow of government, any alien "who avows
himself to be an anarchist, without more," adopts that definition
and is subject to deportation.'0 5 In any event, the Court added, Tur-
ner's speech and proposed lecture topics justified the inferences that
"he contemplated the ultimate realization of his ideal by the use of
force" and that "his speeches were incitements to that end."'' 0 Ac-
cording to the Court, moreover, there could be no constitutional
objection to the Act even if it defined anarchists as "political philos-
ophers innocent of evil intent," for Congress could legitimately con-
clude "that the tendency of the general exploitation of such views is
so dangerous to the public weal that aliens who hold and advocate
them would be undesirable additions to our population." The Court
cautioned that in reaching this conclusion it should not "be under-
stood as depreciating the vital importance of freedom of speech and
of the press." This freedom, the Court felt, was not involved in Tur-
ner, apparently because "as long as human governments endure they
cannot be denied the power of self-preservation.'
10 7
The Court faced related issues in Davis v. Beason, 0 8 the appeal of
a Mormon convicted for falsely taking an oath required by an Idaho
territorial statute for registration as a county elector. The affiant had
to swear that he was not a bigamist or polygamist, nor a member
of any organization "which teaches, advises, counsels or encourages"
bigamy or polygamy. 109 Davis was convicted for signing the oath be-
cause the Mormon church taught bigamy and polygamy.110 His at-
torneys argued that "[h]e did not practice bigamy or polygamy, nor
did he advise anyone else to do so." While pointing out that the
record gave no indication that Davis believed in these practices, his
attorneys emphasized that even if he did, he could not be disen-
franchised as a result."' According to their brief,
[i]t is only when he has done an act that the law has declared
to be criminal that he can be punished or deprived of any right
common to his fellow-citizens, and then he is not punished, or
thus deprived, because of his opinion but because of the com-
mission of the act which has been forbidden by law.1 2
105. 194 U.S. at 293.
106. Id. at 294.
107. Id. The Court also denied that the debate over the constitutionality of the Alien
and Sedition Acts of 1798 had "any bearing upon this case." Id. at 295.
108. 133 U.S. 833 (1890).
109. Id. at 334, 335 n.1.
110. Id. at 334-35.
111. Brief for Appellant at 14-15, Davis v. Beason, 183 U.S. 333 (1890).
112. Id. at 38. The brief, id. at 15, sharply distinguished the facts of Reynolds v.
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This issue was framed and resolved under the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment, but the Court included some significant
dicta on the relationship between speech and crime. Rejecting the
arguments in Davis' brief, the Court reasoned that advocating the
crimes of bigamy or polygamy aids in their commission and could be
punished as appropriately as any other case of aiding and abetting
crime. 113 The oath, the Court concluded, was designed "to prevent
persons from being enabled by their votes to defeat the criminal laws
of the country."" 4 The Court proceeded to affirm Davis' conviction
without citing any evidence that he actually taught, advised, or coun-
seled commission of the forbidden acts. Notwithstanding the First
Amendment, it seemed to assume that Davis' membership in the
Mormon church, like Turner's belief in anarchy, was itself sufficient
for conviction. The Court, as well as the statutes it upheld, took for
granted the proposition that expressions of opinion can themselves be
penalized for their bad tendency to lead to a socially undesirable act.
The First Amendment as the Embodiment of English Common
Law. In the years before World War One, the Supreme Court also
asserted that the First Amendment did not expand the protection
that English common law had given free speech and press at the time
the states ratified the Bill of Rights. In Robertson v. Baldwin,"1 5 a
case decided under the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court declared
that the Bill of Rights did not set forth "any novel principles of gov-
ernment," but simply embodied "certain guaranties and immunities
which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had
from time immemorial been subject to certain well-recognized ex-
ceptions arising from the necessities of the case." The exceptions
"continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed.""' ,
To illustrate this point, the Court stated that free speech did not
"permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent articles,
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming imprisonment and fine of Mormon who
practiced bigamy). The Court in Reynolds, citing Thomas Jefferson, held that under
the First Amendment "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion,
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order." Id. at 164.
113. 133 U.S. at 342; see p. 536 supra (Holmes in Fox identified speaker as "ac-
complice").
114. 133 U.S. at 348. Underlining its willingness to punish speech, the Court rejected
Davis' contention that congressional legislation that prohibited bigamists and polygamists
from voting in territorial elections preempted the power of the Idaho territorial govern-
ment to require the oath. Id. at 347-48. It reasoned that the territorial statute dealt with
a different subject, because the "act of Congress does not touch upon teaching, advising,
and counselling the practice of bigamy and polygamy." Id. at 348.
115. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
116. Id. at 281.
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or other publications injurious to public morals or private repu-
tation."11
7
United States v. Press Publishing Co. 1 8 is consistent with the Rob-
ertson dicta. Press Publishing Company, which owned the New York
World, had been indicted for publishing criminal libels against the
President and the Secretary of War. The alleged libels consisted of
six newspaper articles condemning the acquisition of the Panama
Canal by the United States. Counsel for the publisher moved to quash
the indictment on the ground that a trial would "abridge the liberty
of speech and of the press" and create an atmosphere in which "no
owner or editor of a paper could with safety freely discuss public
affairs." 1" 9 The Court used complicated jurisdictional arguments to
avoid resolving the merits of the case. But by concluding that state
law would provide "adequate means" for punishing the alleged li-
bel,120 the Court hinted that it might find a conviction for criminal
libel permissible under the federal Constitution as well. Thus, the
Court suggested that the common-law crime of libel, possibly includ-
ing seditious libel, survived the ratification of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court, moreover, did not consider the exceptions to
protected speech frozen by the common law in the late eighteenth cen-
tury. Decisions like Davis v. Beason and Turner v. Williams demon-
strate a willingness to punish "evils" unanticipated by the framers
but deemed injurious to the public welfare by contemporary legis-
lators and administrators.
3. Hints of Protection
Only a few, isolated opinions before World War One indicated
that the First Amendment could be more than a paper guarantee.
Several dissents and concurrences identified constitutionally protected
speech. One majority decision, although not addressing First Amend-
ment issues, did protect certain free speech values. None of these
opinions, however, presented a coherent theory of First Amendment
interpretation.
Justice Harlan's dissent in Patterson v. Colorado contained a vig-
117. Id.
118. 219 U.S. 1 (1911).
119. Id. at 7 (quoting Brief for the Defendant in Error at 11). The publisher argued
that sustaining the indictment would give the federal government power "to prosecute
any publisher who had attacked the government, or the character of government officials,
by criticizing their public acts." Brief for the Defendant in Error at 23.
120. 219 U.S. at 15. The Court quashed the federal indictment because it found that
the state court had jurisdiction. Id. at 15-16.
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orous, if undeveloped, defense of freedom of expression. He ex-
plicitly opposed Holmes' conclusion that the First Amendment pre-
vents only prior restraints. He feared Holmes' view would allow a
legislature to "impair or abridge the rights of a free press and of
free speech whenever it thinks that the public welfare requires that
to be done." According to Harlan, legislative determinations of the
public welfare "cannot override constitutional privileges." 12 ' He there-
fore concluded that the contempt conviction of the publisher was un-
constitutional. Although Harlan did not elaborate his views on the
First Amendment, his analysis in Patterson did provide a doctrinal
alternative to the widespread practice of invoking the alleged bad ten-
dency of speech as an automatic barrier against free speech claimants.
Justice Bradley's dissent in Ex parte Curtis also protested that the
majority decision permitted an unconstitutional violation of First
Amendment rights. Attacking the statutory prohibition against fed-
eral employees soliciting or receiving money from each other for po-
litical purposes, he claimed that "[n]either men's mouths nor their
purses can be constitutionally tied up in that way." 2 2 Bradley con-
sidered financial contributions to be among "the necessary and proper
means for promoting political views" because they allow citizens "to
aid discussion and to disseminate information and sound doctrine."'123
He conceded that Congress had acted with the admirable intention of
preventing political corruption, but contended that "in adopting this
particular mode of restraining an acknowledged evil, Congress has
overstepped its legitimate powers, and interfered with the substantial
rights of the citizen."' 2
4
In his concurrence in Turner v. Williams, Justice Brewer ques-
tioned the scope of the majority opinion by suggesting some limita-
tions on the reach of the Alien Immigration Act. He agreed that it
was "not an unreasonable deduction" from the record that Turner
was "an anarchist in the commonly accepted sense of the term, one
who urges and seeks the overthrow by force of all government." How-
ever, Brewer considered it unnecessary for the majority to extend the
law to philosophical anarchists as well. 12 ; His concurrence is far from
a ringing affirmation of First Amendment rights. Brewer did not even
121. 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 465-66 (Brewer, J., dis-
senting) (constitutional claim not frivolous and should therefore have been addressed
by Court).
122. 106 U.S. 371, 377 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 376.
124. Id. at 378.
125. 194 U.S. 279, 296 (1904) (Brewer, J., concurring).
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assert that it would be unconstitutional to deport philosophical an-
archists. But at least he acknowledged that this issue presented a po-
tential problem that the majority should not have addressed and re-
solved so facilely.
Finally, in at least one case, the Supreme Court overruled a Post-
master General's decision to confiscate mail. In American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 26 the Court held that the Post-
master General acted unlawfully in refusing to deliver payments mailed
to a business selling Christian Science treatments. Without reference
to the First Amendment, 127 the Court rejected the Postmaster Gen-
eral's determination that Christian Science is fraudulent by definition.
Noting that "[e]ven intelligent people" differ as to the influence
of the mind on the body, the Court reasoned that "[t]here is no exact
standard of absolute truth" by which to judge the claims of Christian
Scientists. Since the statute dealing with fraudulent use of the mails
was not directed at "mere matters of opinion upon subjects which
are not capable of proof as to their falsity," the Court held that the
Postmaster General was violating the law.128 Although the Court was
not similarly solicitous of differences of opinion in more controversial
settings, Magnetic Healing did indicate that there could be some lim-
its to federal censorship of ideas.
12 9
4. Summary
Despite these hints of protection, Supreme Court decisions in the
generation before World War One reflected a tradition of pervasive
hostility to the value of free speech. The Court rejected First Amend-
ment claims whenever it confronted them directly. But confrontation,
even in rejection, at least lent these claims some status. More fre-
quently, in rendering decisions that today would be based on an
analysis of the First Amendment, the Court did not address free speech
issues at all. The Court repeatedly denied that cases implicated free-
dom of expression, and often made no reference to the First Amend-
ment.
126. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
127. The Statement and Brief In Behalf of Appellants at 43, unlike the briefs in
In re Rapier and Lewis Publishing Co., did not raise First Amendment claims, although
it alleged violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. There is therefore considerable
irony in the fact that Magnetic Healing was the only prewar decision by the Court in
which a majority provided any potential protection to freedom of expression.
128. 187 U.S. at 104.
129. In his dissent in Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 267 (1920), Justice Brandeis
cited Magnetic Healing and applied its reasoning to criticisms of American participa-
tion in World War One.
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B. Decisions Based on State Law
Limiting attention to decisions by the United States Supreme Court
may give a misleading impression of judicial tradition. This caveat
applies with particular force to the prewar interpretation of freedom
of expression, because the Court's strict construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed a major barrier to federal adjudication of First
Amendment claims. Cases decided by other courts, which were gen-
erally based on state law, allow a fuller picture of the prewar judicial
approach to free speech. State courts decided most of these cases, al-
though some reached the federal courts, usually through diversity
jurisdiction. Most of these decisions were as unresponsive to First
Amendment values as their Supreme Court counterparts. But, per-
haps simply as a consequence of a larger sample of judges, issues, and
factual settings, the reasoning and outcome in a significant number of
them provided more meaningful protection for freedom of expres-
sion than any decision produced by the Supreme Court. They demon-
strate that the judicial tradition was not monolithic and that more
libertarian values occasionally received court approval.
1. The Bad Tendency Doctrine
Free speech cases based on state law, like the few Supreme Court
cases that addressed the meaning of the First Amendment, often re-
ferred to the supposed bad tendency of speech for doctrinal support.
These cases arose in a variety of contexts, but most involved perceived
threats to the public order by language considered radical or immoral.
Speech by Radicals. State courts punished speech by many radical
leaders and groups, finding that it had a bad tendency to cause un-
rest in an impressionable public. New York's highest court twice af-
firmed convictions of Johann Most, a prominent radical editor. The
first conviction, under a statute that prohibited assembling with oth-
ers to attempt or threaten "any act tending towards a breach of the
peace," was based on a speech Most delivered to a meeting of anar-
chists the day after the Haymarket defendants had been hanged in
Chicago.130 He urged his audience to "arm yourself, as the day of
revolution is not far off; and when it comes, see that you are ready
to resist and kill those hirelings of capitalists" who, in his opinion,
were responsible for the executions. 31 Most argued that his speech
consisted of prophecies of what would be likely to happen, and not
130. People v. Most, 128 N.Y. 108, 109, 27 N.E. 970, 970 (1891).
131. Id. at 111, 27 N.E. at 971.
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threats that he or others in sympathy with him would commit violence
or murder. -32 The court concluded that the jury's conviction was based
on sufficient evidence,133 reasoning that "[i]ncendiary speeches . . .
before a crowd of ignorant, misguided men, are not less dangerous
because ... [they] are accompanied with the suggestion that the time
is not quite come for action."' 34 Noting that the audience was sym-
pathetic and highly excited, the court stressed that "[n]o one can
foresee the consequences which may result from [such] language.
''135
The court viewed this uncertainty, not as a consideration against pun-
ishing speech, but as an added reason to do so.
Eleven years later, the same court affirmed another conviction of
Most, this time for endangering the public peace by republishing an
article in his newspaper the day President McKinley was shot by an
anarchist.'3 6 The article argued that all government is founded on
murder, and maintained that revolutionary forces sometimes have a
duty to kill "a professional murderer."' 3 7 The court concluded that
the article "manifestly tended toward" a breach of the public peace
by using language that was "an invitation to murder"' 38 and could
not be considered legitimate criticism of public affairs. 39 Although
the article neither addressed a specific person nor advocated the mur-
der of any particular individual, the court observed that its readers
would include "reckless and aggressive" persons "who are ready to
act on such [general] advice, and to become the assassins of those
whom the people have placed in authority." Such articles "naturally
lead" to assassination, and their "punishment and repression are es-
sential to the welfare of society and the safety of the state."1 40 By
invoking the familiar distinction between "free" speech and its "li-
cense" or "abuse," the court stressed that its holding was consistent
with the provisions in the state constitution forbidding the abridg-
ment of speech.1
41
132. Id. at 114-15, 27 N.E. at 972.
133. Id. at 114, 27 N.E. at 972.
134. Id. at 115, 27 N.E. at 972-73.
135. Id. at 115-16, 27 N.E. at 973.
136. People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 64 N.E. 175 (1902). Although the article had been
written fifty years earlier by another author, id. at 425, 64 N.E. at 176, the court found
that Most, by his introductory comment stating that the article "is true even to-day," had
endorsed the sentiments and ratified the advice given, id. at 428, 64 N.E. at 177.
137. Id. at 426-27, 64 N.E. at 176.
138. Id. at 430, 64 N.E. at 178.
139. Id. at 428, 64 N.E. at 177.
140. Id. at 430, 64 N.E. at 178; cI. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277-78 (1915)
(speech not directed at specific person may be punished if it encourages breach of laws);
p. 536 supra (discussing lack of specificity of speech by Fox).
141. 171 N.Y. at 431, 64 N.E. at 178. The court, relying on treatises and precedents
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Emma Goldman confronted similar reasoning when she asked for
an injunction to prevent officials in Philadelphia from denying a pub-
lic hall for her lectures. A Pennsylvania state court, refusing to issue
an injunction, rejected her argument that the officials violated the
free speech clause of the state Constitution. 42 If Goldman lectured,
the court concluded, "dangerous and disturbing sentiments tending
to disturb the peace would be uttered." Even worse, Goldman wanted
to "advocate ideas which, if carried out, would naturally lead to the
destruction of government."' 143 In words close to those of the Su-
preme Court in Turner v. Williams, the Pennsylvania court held that
the government's "right of self-preservation" overrides "such abuse
of the right of free speech.' '1 44 The court closed its opinion, in a
manner typical of the prewar period, by invoking the importance of
free speech while denying its exercise.
145
Cases arising from a strike in Paterson by the Industrial Workers
of the World presented similar issues to the Supreme Court of New
Jersey. The court upheld the convictions of speakers who had urged
violence' 43 and industrial sabotage.147 The statute under which these
speakers were indicted made it a misdemeanor to "encourage," "in-
cite," or "advocate" destruction of property or assaults on individu-
als.14 In sustaining the constitutionality of this statute, the court
stressed that "[i]ncitement to the commission of a crime is a misde-
meanor at common law, whether the crime advocated be actually
committed or not."' 49 The court thus rejected Gilbert Roe's argu-
ment that a defendant's advocacy can be punished "only when coupled
punishing defamation, obscenity, and advertisements for lotteries, asserted that the leg-
islature could constitutionally punish "matter which is injurious to society according to
the standard of the common law." Id.
142. Goldman v. Reyburn, 18 Pa. Dist. R. 883 (1909).
143. Id. at 884.
144. Id. the court also maintained that Goldman's political views signified that she
did not have "hands that are clean." As a result, she could not claim the equitable
relief of an injunction. Id. at 885.
145. Id.
146. State v. Quinlan, 86 N.J.L. 120, 91 A. 111 (Sup. Ct. 1914), afj'd, 87 N.J.L. 333,
93 A. 1086 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915).
147. State v. Boyd, 86 N.J.L. 75, 91 A. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1914), rev'd on other grounds,
87 N.J.L. 560, 94 A. 807 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915).
148. State v. Quinlan, 86 N.J.L. 120, 121-22, 91 A. 111, 112 (Sup. Ct. 1914), afj'd, 87
N.J.L. 333, 93 A. 1086 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915); see State v. Boyd, 86 N.J.L. 75, 76, 91 A.
586, 586 (Sup. Ct. 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 87 N.J.L. 560, 94 A. 807 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1915).
149. State v. Boyd, 86 N.J.L. 75, 79, 91 A. 586, 588 (Sup. Ct. 1914), rev'd on other
grounds, 87 N.J.L. 560, 94 A. 807 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915); see State v. Quinlan, 86 N.J.L.
120, 126, 91 A. 111, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 87 N.J.L. 333, 93 A. 1086 (Ct. Err. & App.
1915).
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with some acts of destruction in pursuance of such advocacy."' 150 Ac-
cording to the court,
free speech does not mean unbridled license of speech, and ...
language tending to the violation of the rights of personal se-
curity and private property, and toward breaches of the public
peace is an abuse of the right of free speech for which, by the
very constitutional language involved, the utterer is responsible.15'
Although conceding that the consequences of speech are relevant to
its legality, the court concluded that the prohibited advocacy itself
"complete[d]" the crime defined by the statute.152
State courts sometimes used the bad tendency rationale to attribute
responsibility to radicals for the potential lawlessness of hostile au-
diences, however moderate the expression or unreasonable the re-
sponse. Sustaining a conviction for the public display of a red flag,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held constitutional a
statute forbidding the use in a parade of a red or black flag or of
any flag "which may be derogatory to public morals."'1 3 According
to the court, statutes designed to preserve the public safety "cannot
be stricken down as unconstitutional unless they manifestly have no
tendency to produce that result." Citing dictionary definitions of
the red flag as a "revolutionary and terroristic emblem," the court
reasoned that the legislature could legitimately view it as the symbol
of ideas hostile to established order and therefore "likely to provoke
turbulence" if carried in parades.
54
The Supreme Court of Michigan similarly upheld the convictions
of socialists for having "infuriated the local public" by displaying the
red flag.155 The court found that the socialists had actual knowledge
that this display "would excite fears and apprehension" and "provoke
violence and disorder" as a "natural and inevitable consequence." The
fact that the public peace was disturbed, not by the socialists, but by
"those whose sentiments they offended," provided no excuse; both
groups "jointly invaded" the rights of the public. 56 Although ac-
150. State v. Boyd, 86 N.J.L. 75, 80, 91 A. 586, 588 (Sup. Ct. 1914), rev'd on other
grounds, 87 N.J.L. 560, 94 A. 807 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915).
151. Id. at 79, 91 A. at 587-88 (referring to free speech provision of state constitution).
152. State v. Quinlan, 86 N.J.L. 120, 127, 91 A. 111, 114 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 87 N.J.L.
333, 93 A. 1086 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915).
153. Commonwealth v. Karvonen, 219 Mass. 30, 31, 106 N.E. 556, 556 (1914).
154. Id. at 32, 106 N.E. at 557. But cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
(reversing conviction under unconstitutionally vague statute prohibiting display of red
flag as emblem of opposition to organized government).
155. People v. Burman, 154 Mich. 150, 155, 117 N.W. 589, 591 (1908).
156. Id. at 156, 117 N.,v. at 592.
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knowledging the socialists' right "to propagate their political views,"
the court "emphatically" denied that in so doing they were permitted
to violate the law. 15 7 In an analogous case, a New York appellate court
affirmed the conviction of Upton Sinclair for leading a peaceful dem-
onstration in front of the Standard Oil Company building to protest
John D. Rockefeller's alleged responsibility for killing women and
children during labor unrest in Colorado.158 If public "reprobation"
is likely "to be resented," the court held, "the behavior evidencing such
reprobation is unlawful as tending to a breach of the peace," even
though conducted in a peaceable and courteous manner. The con-
viction protected "the public interest in the enforcement of law and
the preservation of order" 159 and did not violate Sinclair's First Amend-
ment rights.
Two decisions by the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversing con-
victions in cases arising out of the IWW strike in Paterson, how-
ever, protected free speech in contexts where most courts might have
been tempted to use the bad tendency doctrine to reach the opposite
result. In Haywood v. Ryan,'0 0 it reversed a conviction of IWW lead-
er Bill Haywood for disorderly conduct, finding that Haywood was
not responsible for the crowd he attracted. The court concluded that
under the erroneous construction of the lower court, "almost every
person having something more than a local reputation sufficient to
arouse the curiosity of the public, would be liable to be apprehended
as a disorderly person."'
161
In overturning the conviction of a local newspaper publisher, the
same court reached a remarkable decision which foreshadowed Learned
Hand's famous opinion in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten.162 Dur-
ing the strike, the publisher had printed an article accusing the police
of brutally attacking peaceful strikers, and calling them "drunken
Cossacks," "brass-buttoned anarchists," and "professional strike break-
ers" owned by the Manufacturers' Association.' 1 3 He was found guilty
of violating a state statute that punished those who "advocate the
157. Id. at 157, 117 N.V. at 592.
158. People v. Sinclair, 86 Misc. 426, 149 N.Y.S. 54 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1914). Gilbert Roe
represented Sinclair.
159. Id. at 438, 149 N.Y.S. at 61. But cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)
(striking down disorderly conduct conviction for activity that "stirs the public to anger"
and "invites dispute," because "a function of free speech under our system of govern-
ment is to invite dispute").
160. 85 N.J.L. 116, 88 A. 820 (1913).
161. Id. at 118, 88 A. at 821. In Sinclair, the New York court distinguished Haywood
by pointing out that Sinclair intentionally drew a crowd. 86 Misc. at 439, 149 N.Y.S. at 62.
162. 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917) (Espionage Act punishes
direct incitement to crime, but not mere agitation); see note 415 infra.
163. State v. Scott, 86 N.J.L. 133, 134-35, 90 A. 235, 235 (1914).
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subversion and destruction by force of any and all government" or
"4encourage hostility or opposition to any and all government."'u 4 After
noting that the statute would be "clearly unconstitutional" if it en-
compassed this article within its prohibitions, the court concluded
that the statute proscribed only the advocacy of lawlessness. 1 5 Any
other construction would "prevent all free discussion" regarding
changes in government, "would preclude fair criticism on the con-
duct of public officials," and "would silence the public press."'160 Un-
like Justice Holmes' opinion in a similar situation in Fox, the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey found that the article did not violate
the law, even though it was "couched in hot and intemperate lan-
guage" and might subject its author and publisher to indictment for
criminal libel. 67
Obscenity and Public Morals. The bad tendency standard also gov-
erned the law of obscenity. American courts, in applying the com-
mon law or interpreting the federal Comstock Act,," adopted from
English law the famous Hicklin test of obscenity. That test consid-
ered "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."' I9
Courts extended this approach to prohibit publications that harmed
the "public morals." The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
affirmed a conviction under a law prohibiting publications "prin-
cipally made up of criminal news, police reports, or pictures and
stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime" because "[i]t is im-
possible to say . . . that such publications do not tend to public
demoralization as truly as descriptions of mere obscenity."17 Simi-
164. Id. at 134, 90 A. at 235.
165. Id. at 138-39, 90 A. at 237 (vice of anarchy is not so much belief in state or
condition of society without law, but rather in "promotion and encouragement of dis-
obedience to and contempt of existing laws").
166. Id. at 138, 90 A. at 237. The court pointed out that the statute, enacted as a
result of the excitement following the assassination of President McKinley, was "very
apt to reflect the crude and undigested sentiment of a public upheaval at the cost of
encroachments on constitutional rights." Id. at 136, 90 A. at 236.
167. Id. at 139, 90 A. at 237; cf. pp. 535-36 supra (discussing Holmes' opinion in Fox).
168. Comstock Act, ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 598 (1873) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1976)); see note 41 supra.
169. The Queen v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868); see, e.g., United States v.
Harmon, 45 F. 414, 417 (D. Kan. 1891); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1104
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571); Commonwealth v. Havens, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 545, 549-
50 (1888). But cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (expressly disapproving
Hicklin test).
170. State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18, 26, 27, 46 A. 409, 412, 413 (1900). But cf. Winters
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larly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the indictment of a
defendant who, contrary to law, published an account of an execu-
tion. The court acknowledged that the article was "moderate" and
did not "emphasiz[e] the horrors of executing the death penalty,"17'
but it rejected as "altogether too restricted a view" the argument that
the liberty of the press could not constitutionally be limited unless
the publication was blasphemous, obscene, seditious, or scandalous.
As long as the subject matter was "of such character as naturally
tends to excite the public mind and thus indirectly affect the public
good," it could be penalized. 1'7 2 The court therefore deferred to the
legislative judgment that "it is detrimental to public morals to pub-
lish anything more than the mere fact that the execution has taken
place."17
3
The bad tendency theory of obscenity, however, had an important
detractor. In United States v. Kennerley,17 4 Judge Learned Hand ques-
tioned the validity of the Hicklin test. He criticized Hicklin as an
anachronistic example of "mid-Victorian morals," though he consid-
ered himself bound by precedent to apply it.175 Hand believed that
anything "which is honestly relevant to the adequate expression of
innocent ideas" should not be judged obscene, no matter what lan-
guage that expression takes.1'7 6 Assuming that this "abstract definition"
would not be adopted, Hand argued in the alternative that a com-
munity standard of obscenity, defined on a case-by-case basis by jurors,
would be a major improvement over Hicklin. According to Hand,
the Hicklin test forces society "to accept for its own limitations those
which may perhaps be necessary to the weakest of its members." Al-
lowing jurors to define "the average conscience of the time" would
be "perhaps tolerable."'177 Hand never mentioned the First Amend-
ment in Kennerley, but this decision, like his later opinion in Masses
Publishing Co. v. Patten, criticized the bad tendency test and favored
significantly more protection for speech than analogous cases decided
by his contemporaries.
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1948) (similar statute unconstitutionally vague, thereby
infringing freedom of speech and press); id. at 531-32 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (rely-
ing on McKee and Fox).
171. State v. Pioneer Press Co., 100 Minn. 173, 177, 110 N.W. 867, 868 (1907).
172. Id. at 176, 110 N.W. at 868.
173. Id. at 177, 110 N.W. at 868-69.
174. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
175. Id. at 120.
176. Id. at 120-21.
177. Id. at 121.
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2. Libel
Many American courts did not recognize a good faith privilege for
publishers of defamatory falsehoods about public figures.178 Some
judges even imposed liability if the accuracy of statements could not
be determined.179
Despite numerous decisions to the contrary, however, the Supreme
Court of Kansas allowed a qualified privilege to good faith publishers
of defamatory falsehoods about candidates for public office.' s0 The
court's opinion is even more remarkable for its detail and sophis-
tication than for its result. In a thoughtful discussion of the history
of the law of defamation, 81 it recognized that the relationship between
the First Amendment and the law of defamation had not been clari-
fied and that "judicial decisions had often been narrow, illiberal and
confusing.'"182 As a result, the court considered it necessary to take
into account "the needs and the will of society at the present time"
in deciding cases involving liberty of the press.18 3 Using this approach,
the court concluded that a democratic form of government requires
the "freedom to canvass in good faith the worth of character and
qualifications of candidates for office."'18 4 The court held that such
discussion must be privileged because the substantial public benefit
far outweighs the slight risk of injury to private character.'8 This
178. See, e.g., Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 177 (1883); Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper
Co., 154 Mass. 238, 242, 28 N.E. 1, 4 (1891) (Holmes, J.); Hamilton v. Eno, 81 N.Y. 116,
125-26 (1880); Post Publishing Co. v. Moloney, 50 Ohio St. 71, 88-89, 33 N.E. 921, 925-26
(1893).
179. See, e.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893). According to
Judge Taft,
the danger that honorable and worthy men may be driven from politics and public
service by allowing too great latitude in attacks upon their characters outweighs any
benefit that might occasionally accrue to the public from charges of corruption that
are true in fact, but are incapable of legal proof. The freedom of the press is not
in danger from the enforcement of the rule we uphold.
Id. at 541. But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring
public official to prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth to recover
damages from publisher).
180. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
181. Id. at 716-18, 98 P. at 283. The court cited the "ill-starred" Sedition Act of 1798
as an example of "how far ideas relating to the protection of personal character and
governmental institutions were then unreconciled in legal theory with freedom of thought
and expression upon public questions." Id. at 717, 98 P. at 283.
182. Id. at 718, 98 P. at 283.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 723, 98 P. at 285.
185. Id. at 724, 98 P. at 286. The court recognized that, at times, the injury to the
reputations of individuals might be great, but asserted that the "public welfare" is
more important. Id.
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early example of judicial balancing was as unusual and as prescient 8 6
as Hand's analysis of obscenity in Kennerley.
A New York appellate court, although not extending this privilege
to cover false statements made in good faith, recognized through simi-
lar reasoning the importance of the right to express opinions criti-
cizing public officials. Because "[t]he prevailing or majority opinion
is often the wrong one," the court explained, "the law gives full lati-
tude to the expression of any and all opinions on things of general
concern."'' s7 Only despotic governments, the court added, force peo-
ple to criticize public officials "in whispers or with bated breath."
According to the court, "open discussion and criticism . . is the great
safeguard of free government, and of pure government."' 88 Prose-
cutions and convictions under the Espionage Act would soon punish
"open discussion and criticism" of American war policy by dissidents.
But in the comparatively mild context of corruption charges against
a village official, at least one court before the war identified and ap-
plied this important principle.
3. Political Speech
Unlike the majority of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Curtis'8 9
or Justice Holmes in McAuliffe,190 some state supreme courts pro-
tected political expression, often under the free speech provisions of
their state constitutions. Many of these courts explicitly recognized
the value of political speech in a democratic society.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in marked contrast to Ex parte
Curtis, struck down a corrupt practices act that placed severe limita-
tions on spending for political purposes by persons other than candi-
dates or members of a party committee.19' This decision, based on
both the federal and state constitutions, protected the right of a pri-
vate citizen to spend money "in investigating the governmental, po-
litical, and financial affairs of the state and communicating the re-
sults of his investigations" to the voters.'9 2 "Almost every forward
step in political and governmental affairs," the court concluded, "comes
186. The Supreme Court cited Coleman v. MacLennan at length in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-82 (1964), in support of its announced standard. See
note 179 supra.
187. Howarth v. Barlow, 113 A.D. 510, 513-14; 99 N.Y.S. 457, 459 (1906).
188. Id. at 514; 99 N.Y.S. at 459.
189. 106 U.S. 371 (1882); see p. 531 supra.
190. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); see note
63 supra.
191. State v. Pierce, 163 Wis. 615, 158 N.W. 696 (1916).
192. Id. at 618, 158 N.W. at 697-98.
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as the result of long agitation and discussion in the press, on the
rostrum, and in the open forum of personal contact," often continu-
ing "for years before the idea is formally indorsed by any [political]
party." Moreover, the court asserted, at times "devoted citizens firmly
believe that no organized political party stands for the right or deserves
support and that an independent candidacy is necessary."' 193 If the
spending restrictions were not an abridgment of freedom of speech, the
court concluded, "it would be difficult to imagine what would be."'194
The Supreme Court of Virginia, resting primarily on the free speech
clause of the state constitution, invalidated a statute that prohibited
a variety of public officials, including judges and educators, from
actively participating in politics. 195 The statute defined active partici-
pation to include political speeches and official involvement in po-
litical meetings. 96 After an unsuccessful attempt to distinguish Ex
parte Curtis,197 the court stressed that the state constitutional protec-
tion of free speech is "guaranteed to all the citizens of the state, not
to any portion or any class of citizens." To deprive some citizens of
free speech solely because they are public officials, the court held,
is unconstitutional. 19 The Supreme Court of Missouri, also relying
on the state constitution, invalidated a law that required all groups
publishing reports or recommendations on candidates for public of-
fice to state the supporting facts and the names and addresses of all
persons who furnished them. 99 "If a publication is neither blasphe-
mous, obscene, seditious or defamatory," the opinion held, "then un-
193. Id. at 620, 158 N.W. at 698.
194. Id. at 619, 158 N.W. at 698; cf. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 44-51 (1976) (strik-
ing down limits on "independent" political expenditures).
The same court overruled, on First Amendment grounds, a contempt citation issued to
a critic of his judicial record by a judge who was a candidate for reelection. State ex
rel. Attorney General v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 72 N.W. 193 (1897). The court held
that the judge could bring an action for libel, but that sustaining the contempt power
in these circumstances would effectually "gag the press, and subvert freedom of speech."
Id. at 12, 72 N.W. at 196.
195. Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196 (1884).
196. Id. at 197.
197. Id. at 204.
198. Id. at 206. This court viewed constitutional rights as evolving rather than static,
an atypical approach during an era of judicial formalism. It cited as the decisive his-
torical turning point the popular reaction against the "ambitious and despotic rulers"
responsible for the Sedition Act of 1798, "which trammeled freedom of speech." Id. at
204-05.
The Supreme Court, however, continues to allow comparable restrictions on federal
employees, citing for support Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). Two decisions have
upheld the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (1976), which bars civil servants from taking an
"active part in political management or in political campaigns." United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 554-55 (1973); United Public
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96-98 (1947).
199. Ex parte Harrison, 212 Mo. 88, 110 S.W. 709 (1908).
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der the Constitution of this State, no court has the right to restrain
it, nor the Legislature power to punish it."200
4. Labor Injunctions
The development of injunctions as the "central lever" in "the ad-
ministration of justice between employer and employee" 20' provided
another source of litigation over free speech issues. Toward the end
of the nineteenth century, the courts expanded the injunction into
"an enveloping code of prohibited conduct."202 Courts issued injunc-
tions to forbid various activities of union leaders and their support-
ers, thereby employing "the most powerful resources of the law on
one side of a bitter social struggle. ' 203 Judges often used the same
broad and vague injunction in numerous cases, without adaptation
to the facts of the particular labor dispute.20 4 Many of the most out-
rageous injunctions were directed against speech and prohibited "op-
probrious epithets," language that was "bad," "abusive," "annoying,"
or "indecent," and words such as "scab," "traitor," and "unfair. ' 20 5
Some judges even held that picketing per se is unlawful. 20 6
The courts rarely gave elaborate theoretical explanations for their
use of labor injunctions. The decision of the Supreme Court of
Michigan in Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union,207 how-
ever, does contain some revealing analysis. Although acknowledging
that the free speech clause of the Michigan Constitution prohibits
injunctions against libels, the court, in order to avoid irreparable in-
jury to property rights, upheld an injunction against a circular urg-
ing a boycott. The court found that the purpose of the circular was
not just to libel the employer, but to intimidate and prevent the
public from doing business with him.-208 As did the United States
200. Id. at 93, 110 S.W. at 710.
201. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 52 (1930).
202. Id. at 200.
203. Id. at 81.
204. Id. at 89-106.
205. Id. at 98.
206. For example, a federal judge in Iowa reasoned that "[t]here is and can be no
such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity, or peace-
ful mobbing, or lawful lynching. When men want to converse or persuade, they do not
organize a picket line." Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (C.C.S.D. Iowa
1905); accord, Pierce v. Stablemen's Local 8760, 156 Cal. 70, 79, 103 P. 324, 328 (1909);
A.R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232 Ill. 424, 436, 83 N.E. 940,
944-45 (1908); George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 72 N.J. Eq. 653,
663-64, 66 A. 953, 957-58 (1907), aff'd, 77 N.J. Eq. 219, 225, 79 A. 262, 264-65 (1908).
207. 118 Mich. 497, 77 N.W. 13 (1898).
208. Id. at 526-27, 77 N.WV. at 24-25. But cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98-
106 (1940) (declaring unconstitutional overly broad statute prohibiting peaceful picketing).
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Supreme Court in Gompers, it seemed to view speech used in con-
nection with a labor boycott as a "verbal act" beyond the protection
of free speech guarantees.20 9
Some courts resisted the growing use of the labor injunction. A
few even held that injunctions constitute prior restraints and are there-
fore incompatible with the constitutional protection of free speech.2 10
Other courts, without adopting such a rigid rule, conceded that picket-
ing was not necessarily unlawful. For example, a federal appellate
court sharply contrasted permissible "picketing" for purposes of com-
munication, which appeals to a person's "free judgmen[t]," with un-
lawful "duress," which "intimidate[s] . . . as effectually as . . . physical
assault." The court acknowledged that "[u]nder the name of persua-
sion, duress may be used," but it cautioned that "it is duress, not
persuasion, that should be restrained and punished." Applying this
distinction, the court refused to prohibit "picketing, as such."211 Jus-
tice Holmes, while still on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, made a similar point in a famous dissent. He objected to an
injunction that, in his view, prohibited "organized persuasion or ar-
gument, although free from any threat of violence, either express or
implied." 212 Holmes thought that the majority made the unwarrant-
209. See 118 Mich. at 526-27, 77 N.w. at 24-25; cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (upholding labor injunction by distinguishing normal speech
from "verbal act"); p. 532 supra (discussing Gompers).
The courts, by contrast, were more impressed by the claims of employers that "black-
listing" statutes, which required employers to provide written explanations to discharged
employees, were unconstitutional. Most prewar decisions agreed with the argument that
free speech implies a "correlative" right not to speak and that the blacklisting statutes
violated this implicit right. See, e.g., Atchison, T. 9- S.F. Ry. v. Brown, 80 Kan. 312, 315,
102 P. 459, 460 (1909); accord, Wallace v. Georgia, C. & N. Ry., 94 Ga. 732, 22 S.E. 579
(1894); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 485, 171 S.W. 703, 705 (1914).
210. See, e.g., Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 143-50, 67
S.W. 391, 393-96 (1902) (statements by union members urging boycott may be punished
but not enjoined). The court distinguished the circular at issue from enjoinable "verbal
acts," which the court defined as threats with the "present ability to be carried into
execution." Id. at 150, 67 S.W. at 396. The Supreme Court used the term "verbal acts,"
defined somewhat differently, to sustain an injunction against a similar circular. Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911); see pp. 531-32 supra.
Some courts, in very different contexts, held that the constitutional right to free speech
precludes prior restraints. See Dailey v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. 94, 99-100, 44 P. 458, 460
(1896) (overturning order prohibiting performance and advertisements for play during
pending trial in murder case on which play was based; any "abuse" could subsequently
be punished and any defendant unfairly prejudiced by publication could be retried).
211. Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45, 51 (7th Cir. 1908);
accord, Karges Furniture Co. v. Woodworkers Local 131, 165 Ind. 421, 431-33, 75 N.E.
877, 880-81 (1905); Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union No, 90, 105
Va. 188, 197-98, 53 S.E. 273, 275-76 (1906).




ed assumption that picketing "necessarily carries with it a threat
of bodily harm."
213
5. Speech in Public Places
The lower courts were generally hostile to challenges against statutes
that prohibited speech in public places. Some of these decisions, un-
like Davis v. Massachusetts,214 at least addressed free speech concerns
while denying the free speech claim. Sustaining the conviction of a
socialist professor for deliberately speaking without a permit required
by local ordinance, the Supreme Court of Georgia illustrated the
low priority often afforded First Amendment interests.2 15 The court
pointed out that "[t]he primary object of streets is for public pas-
sage" 210 and that "[a] man has many constitutional and legal rights
which he can not lawfully exercise in the streets of a city."'217 As
one example, it stated that "[t]he constitutional right to exercise one's
lawful vocation is quite as sacred and often more important than
the right to make speeches, but the exercise of either right must yield
to the municipal power properly exercised over the streets."2 ' 8
Other decisions upheld municipal ordinances prohibiting speech
only in specified places. The reasoning of a California appellate court
is typical:
This ordinance does not attempt to suppress freedom of speech,
or seek to interfere with the citizen in the right to express his
views upon any subject, political, religious or otherwise, as is
suggested by petitioner. It simply specifies a certain district with-
in the city wherein no one may do the things prohibited.21 9
The court acknowledged that it was unable to judge the reasonable-
ness of the boundaries, but concluded that, "[w]here no abuse of dis-
cretion appears," the judiciary should defer to local legislative de-
terminations.
220
There were a few countervailing decisions. In several cases brought
by members of the Salvation Army, courts overturned ordinances giv-
213. Id. at 105, 44 N.E. at 1080.
214. 167 U.S. 43 (1897); see pp. 529-30 supra.
215. Fitts v. City of Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 571, 49 S.E. 793, 795 (1905). The city au-
thorities had withdrawn without explanation a permit previously issued to him. He then
advertised a street lecture to test the ordinance. Id. at 568-70, 49 S.E. at 793-94.
216. Id. at 570, 49 S.E. at 794.
217. Id. at 570, 49 S.E. at 795.
218. rd. at 571, 49 S.E. at 795.
219. Ex parte Thomas, 10 Cal. App. 375, 377, 102 P. 19, 20 (Dist. Ct. App. 1909).
220. Id.
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ing local authorities broad discretion over the time, place, and man-
ner of parades and public speeches. These decisions cited the value
of public demonstrations and discussions to democratic government.
The Supreme Court of Michigan, for example, invalidated a city ordi-
nance by pointing out that "unregulated official discretion" 22' to
control parades "would enable a mayor or council to shut off proces-
sions of those whose notions did not suit their views or tastes, in
politics or religion, or any other matter on which men differ."222
Acknowledging that reasonable restrictions on the "times and oc-
casions" of public assemblies may be necessary, the court emphasized
that regulation could only be justified because of actual or threatened
harm rather than "because of the sentiments or purposes of the move-
ment, if not otherwise unlawful." 223 It added that "to suppress things
not absolutely dangerous, as an easy way of getting rid of the trouble
of regulating them, is not a process tolerated under free institutions. -"22 4
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared unconstitu-
tional a local ordinance that' excepted only funerals, fire and militia
companies, and political parties from the requirement of obtaining
a discretionary permit from the mayor before parading on certain
public streets while singing, shouting, or playing musical instruments.
The court labeled the ordinance "entirely un-American and in con-
flict with the principles of our institutions and all modem ideas of
civil liberty."225 In the court's opinion, the ordinance more closely
resembled "petty tyranny" than "any fair or legitimate provision in
the exercise of the police power of the state to protect the public
peace and safety. '2 26 "The spirit of our free institutions," an Illinois
appellate court also observed, "allows great latitude in public parades
and demonstrations, whether religious or political." As long as they
are not a threat to the public peace and do not violate the rights of
others, "every measure repressing them, whether by legislative en-
actment, or municipal ordinance, is an encroachment upon fundamen-
tal and constitutional rights." 227
221. In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 407, 30 N.W. 72, 76 (1886).
222. Id. at 406-07, 30 N.W. at 76.
223. Id. at 405, 30 N.W. at 75.
224. Id. at 404, 30 N.W. at 74.
225. State ex tel. Gerrabad v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 594-95, 54 N.W. 1104, 1107 (1893).
226. Id. at 594, 54 N.W. at 1107. The court stressed that the ordinance denied "the
equal protection of the laws" because it lacked "an equal and uniform application to all
persons, societies, or organizations similarly circumstanced," and was "susceptible of unjust
discriminations." Id. at 595, 54 N.W. at 1107-08.
227. Rich v. City of Naperville, 42 Ill. App. 222, 223-24 (1891). The court notcd that
since the landing of the Mayflower, the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a
lawful purpose has been "among the fundamental rights of a free people." Id. at 223.
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It is, of course, revealing that courts did not apply the theoretical
standards developed in the relatively innocuous Salvation Army cases228
to similar claims raised by socialists. Most dramatically, the Supreme
Court of Michigan, which in its Salvation Army case in 1886 warned
against "suppress[ing] things not absolutely dangerous, ' 229 held in 1908
that socialists could not parade with red flags because their display
would offend and arouse the general public. 23 0 In the Salvation Army
case the court pointed out that parades "with banners and other para-
phernalia" have been "customary, from time immemorial, in all free
countries, and in most civilized countries, for people who are as-
sembled for common purposes."12 3 ' The same court was later unmoved
by the socialists' argument that the red flag "is an emblem of their
order, and signifies brotherhood.
'2 32
C. The Judicial Tradition
These decisions demonstrate that many free speech cases, involv-
ing a great variety of litigants and issues, reached the courts in the
generation before Congress passed the Espionage Act. The overwhelm-
ing weight of judicial opinion in all jurisdictions offered little recog-
nition and even less protection of free speech interests. Although radi-
cal and dissident activity prompted many of the prosecutions, it alone
cannot account for the restrictive results. Political speech by govern-
ment employees, public sermons by ministers, and newspaper reports
of crime also produced decisions that rejected First Amendment claims.
A general hostility to the value of free expression permeated the ju-
dicial system. This pervasive hostility had few doctrinal underpinnings,
nor was it openly expressed. Judges often emphasized the sanctity
of free speech in the very process of reaching adverse decisions in con-
crete cases.
Some opinions, predominantly in the state courts, reveal that re-
strictive decisions did not reflect the entire judicial spectrum. Courts
occasionally protected freedom of expression and pointed to issues
that contemporary scholars and postwar judicial decisions addressed
228. Not all protective "time, place, and manner" decisions involved the Salvation
Army, see, e.g., State v. Hughes, 72 N.C. 25 (1875) (noisy but peaceful celebration of Eman-
cipation Proclamation), and not all decisions protected the Salvation Army, see, e.g., Com-
mo'nwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N.E. 224 (1889) (upholding conviction for playing
music in public streets without permit).
229. In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 404, 30 NAV. 72, 74 (1886); see p. 556 supra.
230. People v. Burman, 154 Mich. 150, 155-56, 117 N.W. 589, 591-92 (1908); see pp.
546-47 supra.
231. In re Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 404, 30 N.W. 72, 74 (1886).
232. People v. Burman, 154 Mich. 150, 153, 117 N.W. 589, 591 (1908).
557
The Yale Law Journal
more systematically. For the most part, however, the few relatively
libertarian opinions were not analytically more rigorous than the norm
for this period. Even when supporting free speech claims, they gen-
erally did not explain in any meaningful detail the basis for the re-
sult. They did not attempt to develop guidelines for determining
what constitutes speech or when speech may be unlawful, perhaps be-
cause they devoted so little attention to considering the interests the
First Amendment was designed to safeguard.
The analytical sterility of most opinions, regardless of outcome,
was self-perpetuating. Judges did not challenge each other to think
deeply about the First Amendment and were therefore less likely to
revise their views. But there were a sufficient number of libertarian
decisions to suggest that judges were not simply unable to conceive
of more generous approaches to the First Amendment. It seems like-
ly that many judges who reached restrictive decisions knew some of
the protective precedents and consciously, if seldom explicitly, re-
jected them.2 33 In any event, the fact that some prewar judges could
be sympathetic to free speech claims suggests that the tradition of in-
sensitivity was not so dominant that only an intellectual breakthrough
in First Amendment interpretation could have created the possibility
of different results. The existence of protective decisions, even more
than their relative paucity, emphasizes the general judicial hostility
toward free speech before World War One.
The prewar cases also demonstrate that the decisions in Selective
Draft Law and Espionage Act prosecutions during and immediately
after World War One were neither a temporary aberration from a
libertarian tradition nor the consequence of an initial encounter
with the First Amendment. The wartime and postwar decisions were
depressingly similar to their prewar antecedents. They continued an
existing tradition of hostility to free speech claims by reaching re-
strictive results through simplistic justifications that rarely considered
the meaning of the First Amendment. To give the most obvious ex-
amples, Justice Holmes' decisions in the first Espionage Act cases
2 3 4
are not appreciably different in analysis or result from his prewar
233. Free speech claimants in some cases cited protective decisions by other courts. See,
e.g., Brief of Appellants, supra note 79, at 21-22, 47-54 (Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Conm'n of Ohio) (relying on cases invalidating prior restraints, see note 210 supra); Brief
for Plaintiff in Error, supra note 60, at 55-61 (Davis v. Massachusetts) (citing cases per-
mitting parades by Salvation Army); In re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 558-59, 38 P. 981 (1895)
(reported only in California Reports) (summarizing petitioner's argument, which cited
four protective Salvation Army decisions); cf. id. at 565-66, 38 P. at 983-84 (court's attempt
to distinguish protective cases).
234. See pp. 584-86 infra.
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decisions in Patterson v. Colorado and Fox v. Washington. On the
other hand, this established tradition of hostility makes even more
dramatic the rapid reorientation of First Amendment theory by the
postwar civil libertarians, whose ranks Justices Holmes and Brandeis
soon joined.
II. Legal Scholarship
Scholars as well as judges considered the meaning of freedom of
expression in the generation before Congress passed the Espionage
Act. Just as case law preceded Schenck, treatises and articles antici-
pated Chafee. This legal scholarship stands in striking contrast to the
tradition of judicial hostility to First Amendment values. Unlike the
prewar decisions, which were generally restrictive and poorly rea-
soned, much of the legal writing of this period used sophisticated
analyses to reach protective standards. Relatively libertarian theory,
moreover, was not the province of eccentric iconoclasts. The authors
included some of the most eminent scholars in the country. They of-
fered convincing doctrinal support for free speech claims, but their
ideas did not gain significant judicial acceptance until after the United
States entered World War One.
Within this scholarship, five authors were particularly important.23 5
235. Other scholarship published during this period, although not as comprehensive or
insightful as the work of the five authors who will be discussed in detail, is also worth
examining. Most of these other writers simply summarized the existing case law, often
approvingly, but some of them addressed a particular free speech issue in depth. See,
e.g., Bikl, The Jurisdiction of the United States over Seditious Libel, 50 Am. L. REG. 1,
26 (1902) (First Amendment permits punishment for seditious libel and other speech that
"seriously affect[s] the stability and efficiency of government"); Rogers, The Extension of
Federal Control Through the Regulation of the Mails, 27 HARV. L. REv. 27 (1913) (warn-
ing against increased reliance on postal power to restrict First Amendment rights indi-
rectly, but not criticizing Supreme Court decisions about which author clearly uncom-
fortable); Rogers, Federal Interference with the Freedom of the Press, 23 YALE L.J. 559,
579 (1914) (analyzing "constitutional incidents in which the liberty of the press has
figured" and concluding that "in no case has it been abridged"); Veeder, Freedom of
Public Discussion, 23 HARv. L. REv. 413 (1910) (thorough review of law of defamation,
advocating full debate on matters of public interest and protection for false statements of
fact); Note, Restrictions on the Freedom of the Press, 16 HARv. L. REv. 55, 56 (1902) (ob-
serving without disapproval that free speech guarantees are "little more than a declaration
of English common law principles").
Given the current assumption that there was little or no First Amendment activity be-
fore World War One, it is interesting to read in a law review note published in 1916
that, except for the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment is "the most popular
as well as the most versatile of the constitutional guaranties." Note, Constitutional Law-
Freedom of Speech and of the Press-Recent Decisions, 65 U. PA. L. Rav. 170, 170 (1916).
This note identified the growing "struggle between capital and labor" and "the increase
of reform legislation of doubtful constitutionality" as the two major sources of First
Amendment litigation. Id. at 174.
Case and Comment devoted its November 1915 issue to a "Free Speech Number." The
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Two respected and widely cited treatises, Thomas Cooley's Consti-
tutional Limitations2- 6 and Ernst Freund's The Police Power,237 in-
cluded sections on freedom of speech. At the annual meeting of the
American Sociological Society in 1914, Henry Schofield, a professor
at Northwestern University Law School, presented a comprehensive
paper on "Freedom of the Press in the United States." 238 Roscoe
Pound, perhaps the most influential legal scholar of his generation,
wrote two articles in the Harvard Law Review that, while limited in
scope, offered highly original and provocative interpretations of the
First Amendment.2 39 The prodigious theoretical writings of Theodore
Schroeder, the guiding force behind the Free Speech League,240 were
the most extensive and libertarian treatments of freedom of speech
in the prewar period.2 41 Despite their often convoluted style and hys-
terical tone, Schroeder's writings were an early and comprehensive
statement of what modem scholars would describe as an "absolutist"
articles are essentially descriptive, but several characterized from different perspectives the
state of the law on free speech. Two authors approved of existing case law, Ackerly, Con-
stitutional Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 22 CASE & Com. 457 (1915); Chamberlain,
Freedom of Speech in Public Streets, Parks and Commons, 22 CASE 9- COM. 461 (1915),
while two others criticized the prevailing judicial tradition as overly restrictive, Morton,
Free Speech and Its Enemies, 22 CASE & Coms. 471 (1915); Shepard, Freedom of Speech
in Industrial Controversies, 22 CASE & Com. 466 (1915).
236. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (7th ed. 1903); see note 322 infra (dis-
cussing reception of Cooley's treatise).
237. E. FREUND, supra note 28.
238. Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the United States, 9 Am. Soc. Soc'Y: PAPERS &
PROCEEDINGS 67 (1914), reprinted in 2 H. SCHOFIELD, ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw AND
EquiTy 510 (1921). In his lengthy "bibliographical note," Chafee singled out Schofield's
article as "[t]he best discussion of the legal meaning" of freedom of the press. Chafee-
Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 932 n.1.
239. Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 640 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Pound-Equitable Relief]; Pound, Interests of Per-
sonality (pts. 1-2), 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 445 (1915) [hereinafter cited as Pound-Personality].
240. See note 19 supra (discussing Schroeder and Free Speech League).
241. See, e.g., T. SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS (enl. ed. 1916); T. SCHROEDER,
"OBSCENE" LITERATURE AND CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW (1911). These collections of essays are
somewhat disorganized and repetitive, as Schroeder himself realized. In sending a copy
of "Obscene" Literature and Constitutional Law to Chafee, Schroeder explained that he
had made "a hasty grouping of magazine essays without time for planning the book
and revision." Letter from Theodore Schroeder to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Oct. 1, 1919)
(Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 14, Folder 26, Harvard Law School Library).
THEODORE SCHROEDER, A COLD ENTHUSIAST (R. McCoy ed. 1973) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) is an indispensable guide to Schroeder's publications. It consists largely of a
lengthy annotated bibliography of works by and about Schroeder divided by subject, a
list of other Schroeder bibliographies, and a summary of the ninety-one boxes in the
Schroeder Papers. Schroeder's works include a FREE SPEECH BIBLIOGRAPHY (1922) and nu-
merous articles in legal periodicals. See, e.g., Schroeder, The Constitution and Obscenity
Postal Laws, 69 ALBANY L.J. 334 (1907); Schroeder, Political Crimes Defined, 18 MICH.
L. REV. 30 (1919); Schroeder, Presumptions and Burden of Proof as to Malice in Criminal
Libel, 49 AM. L. REV. 199 (1915) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder-Malice in Criminal Libel].
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approach to the First Amendment. Unfortunately, they have failed to
receive the serious scholarly attention they deserve.2 42
These scholars rarely described or criticized each other's argu-
ments. They sometimes cited cases as raw material for the presenta-
tion of free speech issues, but rarely as guides to analysis, an under-
standable approach given the poor quality of judicial precedents. Nor
did they rely on prior scholarly treatment of the First Amendment,
perhaps because none of significance existed. 243 Nevertheless, all five
discussed a number of similar themes and, despite differences in em-
phasis, their published work reveals broad areas of agreement.
Like their modern counterparts, these scholars were most united
in their criticisms of judicial decisions. They castigated American
courts for adopting as a constitutional standard Blackstone's position
that free speech means nothing more than the prohibition of prior
restraints. Pound and Schofield accused judges of failing to make
useful distinctions between protected and unprotected speech.2 44 Pound
pointed out the courts' occasional "over-insistence" upon the state's
interest in security,245 and Schofield called the practice of holding
newspaper editors in contempt for criticizing judicial conduct "intol-
erable"246 and a reestablishment of the Star Chamber.24 7 "When judges
in solemn and deliberate opinions," Schofield further complained,
242. I have found Auerbach, supra note 19, although confined to the contents of the
volume he introduces, to be the best discussion of the substance of Schroeder's work.
Several modern scholars have commented on Schroeder's significance, see, e.g., P. BOYER,
PURITY" IN PRINT 41-42 (1968); FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN
COURT 279-80 (H. Nelson ed. 1967) (editor's introduction to article by Schroeder); J. PAUL
& M. SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 52-53; Emerson, supra note 22, at 656 n.28, and some
have lamented his relative obscurity, see, e.g., L. LEVY, supra note 5, at 157 n.76; Auerbach,
supra note 19, at v.
"If you consider Freedom of Speech socially as well as politically," Freund wrote Chafee,
"Theodore Schroeder deserves a place in your bibliography." Letter from Ernst Freund
to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Aug. 13, 1919) (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 14, Folder 10,
Harvard Law School Library). Chafee wrote to Schroeder with apologies for not citing
his work in the Harvard Law Review article and promised to remedy this omission in a
forthcoming book. Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Theodore Schroeder (Sept. 29,
1919) (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 14, Folder 26, Harvard Law School Library). In
a "Bibliography on Freedom of Speech" at the end of Freedom of Speech, supra note 3,
at 378, Chafee observed that "[m]uch useful material is collected in the writings of
Theodore Schroeder" and referred to a bibliography of Schroeder's work and to two of
Schroeder's recent articles.
243. Without research into earlier periods of American history, it is impossible to de-
termine if these prewar scholars ignored their predecessors, or simply had none.
2.4. Pound-Equitable Relief, supra note 239, at 651 ("[n]o very clear line is to be
found in the decisions"); Schofield, supra note 238, at 102 (case law concerning libel "in
an extremely loose and fluid state").
245. Pound-Personality, supra note 239, at 454.
246. Schofield, supra note 238, at 115.
247. Id. at 107.
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"bracket striking and boycotting workmen with anarchists, then the
tu quoque hot retort of the workmen that the judges are tools of the
corporations is essentially human. 2 48 Cooley, observing that the courts
traditionally adapted "the plastic rules of the common law" to accom-
modate change, criticized judges for not developing the law of libel
to provide greater protection for newspapers, "one of the chief means
for the education of the people.
2 49
Schroeder was the most vitriolic in his criticism of judicial deci-
sions. "[J]udicial history," he concluded, "abundantly shows that
courts have destroyed and evaded the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of speech and of the press"2 50 by "dogmatically" creating "new
exceptions and limitations, which are not represented by a single
word in the constitution itself. '' 251 Judges, in Schroeder's opinion, had
suffered from "an epidemic of respectable hysteria" that "incapaci-
tate[d] them for critical thinking,"252 as demonstrated by their re-
liance on "stupid" and "meaningless epithets" such as "licentious-
ness." 253 When judges complained that free speech could not be
defined, they undertook "authoritatively to make their own intellectual




These scholars did not simply criticize the courts. They attempted
to construct theoretical support for their free speech values by inves-
tigating the meaning and limitations of the First Amendment. And
though they evidently thought and wrote independently, a substan-
tial degree of consensus emerged from their articles and books. They
emphasized social interests in freedom of expression, including the
positive influence of the exchange of ideas on the development of
civilization and, particularly, the importance of political discussion
to democratic government. Most of them distinguished "public" from
248. Id. at 106. In a calmer moment, Schofield simply observed that the courts seemed
to consider freedom of the press to be "of little practical importance." Id. at 112.
249. T. COOLEY, supra note 236, at 641. He also objected to defamation cases that
narrowly defined the scope of privileged criticism of public officials and candidates for
office. Id. at 624-28.
250. T. SCHROEDER, Our Progressive Despotism, in FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS 73, 81 (enl.
ed. 1916) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder-Our Progressive DesPotismn.
251. T. SCHROEDER, The Judicial Destruction of Freedom of the Press, in "OBSCENE"
LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154, 155 (1911).
252. Schroeder-Our Progressive Despotism, supra note 250, at 81.
253. T. SCHROEDER, Judicial Dogmatism on "Freedom of the Press," in "OBSCENE" LIT-
ERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 163, 204 (1911).
254. T. SCHROEDER, Methods of Constitutional Construction, in FREE SPEECH FOR RADI-
CALS 82, 87 (enl. ed. 1916) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder-Constitutional Construction].
Freund, in contrast to the other four authors, refrained from making specific criticisms
of judicial precedents, even though several of the cases he cited were inconsistent with his
theoretical approach. See notes 284-85 infra.
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''private" concerns and argued that the First Amendment provides
greater safeguards for the discussion of public affairs, especially by
political and religious minorities. Several believed that broad protec-
tion for freedom of speech would reduce the threat of disorder and
that its repression would be more likely to lead to actual violence.
Consistent with these views, they generally rejected, as incompatible
with the First Amendment, the English common-law crime of sedi-
tious libel, other tests based on the alleged bad tendency of speech,
and Blackstone's opinion that free speech prohibits only prior re-
straints. With various degrees of explicitness, several recognized in-
citement to unlawful action as the point at which speech may con-
stitutionally be punished. Most of these scholars also agreed that the
First Amendment did not abolish common-law crimes such as libel
and obscenity. However, they generally maintained that the First
Amendment provides basic safeguards that could be expanded, but
not limited, as society develops.
A. The Social Interest in Free Speech
Although none of these prewar scholars created an explicit meth-
odology, they all examined the meaning of free speech through his-
torical and functional rather than formal analyses. Their views de-
rived from their understanding of its fundamental purpose, and they
generally agreed that the First Amendment and analogous state con-
stitutional guarantees were designed above all to ensure society's in-
terest in free discussion. Schofield reiterated throughout his article
that "the common right of public and truthful discussion of public
affairs exists as a right held in trust for the educational profit and
benefit of the public" rather than as a private entitlement of in-
dividuals.255 Freund also stressed the First Amendment's role in guar-
anteeing "[t]he most ample freedom of discussion of public affairs." 25 6
Cooley's treatise made explicit the relationship between freedom
of expression and democratic government that seemed to underlie
these assertions by Schofield and Freund. The First Amendment, in
Cooley's opinion, is "essential to the very existence and perpetuity
of free government. 257 It checks the abuse of power by enabling citi-
zens to make just criticisms of the conduct of persons in authority,
255. Schofield, supra note 238, at 91; see id. at 82, 92, 104. According to Schofield, the
Firbt Amendment was intended to give constitutional force to the saying, "'And ye shall
know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.'" Id. at 116.
256. E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 509.
257. T. CooLEY, supra note 236, at 596.
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thereby holding them accountable to public opinion. The free and
general discussion of public matters, moreover, is "absolutely essen-
tial to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights
as citizens.
12 5 8
Although Pound viewed free speech as an "individual natural right"
guaranteed by the First Amendment, he argued that the social in-
terest in freedom of expression, though less recognized, is more im-
portant. The state protects itself by allowing its citizens free speech
because the "individual will fight for his beliefs no less than for
his life and limb and for his honor." Of greater and increasing im-
portance, the free exercise of mental and spiritual faculties serves the
community's interest in the "moral and social life of the individual."2 0
At times, even Theodore Schroeder, the "absolutist" and individual-
ist who ceaselessly advocated unabridged freedom of speech, acknowl-
edged that social interests in free expression outweigh personal ones.
The First Amendment, in Schroeder's opinion, is "not only a ques-
tion of the opportunity to speak, but of the more important opportunity
of the whole public to hear and to read whatever they may choose,
when all are free to offer." The "personal liberty of the speaker or
writer" is less significant, Schroeder wrote, than the "racial intellectual
development" of society, which is promoted by "keeping open all ave-
nues for the greatest possible interchange of ideas."2 0
B. The Distinction Between Public and Private Speech
This shared affirmation of the social importance of free expres-
sion, often traced to the historical origins of the First Amendment,
led most of these scholars, with varying degrees of emphasis and ex-
plicitness, to distinguish "public" from "private" speech.
201
1. Schofield's Formulation of the Distinction
Schofield placed major emphasis on the public-private distinction,
which he considered crucial for a proper understanding of the First
Amendment. According to Schofield, the American Revolution was
258. Id. at 604.
259. Pound-Personality, supra note 239, at 453.
260. T. SCHROEDER, The Meaning of Unabridged "Freedom of Speech," in FREE SPEECH
FOR RADICALS 37, 42 (enl. ed. 1916) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder-Unabridged "Freedom
of Speech"].
261. For the most famous analysis of this distinction, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note
77, at 38-41, 61-63, 68-70, 93-100. Recent scholarly discussions include BeVier, The First
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. RaV. 299 (1978); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26-35 (1971).
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intended to abolish the English common law governing freedom of
expression.2 2 That definition prohibited all prior censorship but did
not consider either the truth or the subject of the speech in evaluating
its liability to subsequent punishment. Publications were unlawful,
whether true or false, if the judges found that they had a "tendency
to excite and move the people to change the existing order.' '203
In fact, there could be increased liability for true statements because
they might be particularly likely to have a tendency to disrupt so-
ciety.2 14 As Schofield pointed out, many prerevolutionary publica-
tions on politics in the colonies were seditious under this standard.23 5
Schofield concluded that the First Amendment "obliterated the
English common-law test of supposed bad tendency" 260 and "legal-
ize[d] published truth on all matters of public concern."2 67 It there-
fore imposed on judges the new responsibilities of distinguishing "pri-
vate" from "public" speech and "of determining what is truth in a
publication on a matter of public concern."2 68 Schofield reasoned that
true opinions, defined as inferences that could be drawn from true
facts by "a fair-minded average man," are also covered by the First
Amendment. Such protection, Schofield believed, "leaves a wide mar-
gin for the play and action of conflicting opinions on matters of pub-
lic concern." 20 9
As corollaries to this view, Schofield acknowledged that the First
Amendment does not extend either to "false news having a tendency
to mislead the people on matters of public concern" 270 or to any state-
ments, whether true or false, dealing with "private" subjects .271 For
example, even truthful advertisements are not encompassed by the
First Amendment, for they are designed only "to promote private
welfare" and are "not educational publications to promote the gen-
eral welfare. ' 27 2 Because Schofield believed that "indecent, obscene,
262. Schofield, suPra note 238, at 78-79.
263. Id. at 74.
264. This proposition is illustrated by the English common-law maxim, "the greater
the truth the greater the libel." Id. at 79. But see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 86, at
*150 (immaterial whether libel is true or false).
265. Schofield, supra note 238, at 76.
266. Id. at 78.
267. Id. at 110.
268. Id. at 79.
269. Id. at 80.
270. Id. at 81.
271. Id. at 79.
272. Id. at 105. For Schofield, advertisements included not only "[p]ublications adver-
tising lotteries and other devices to make easy and quick money," id. at 83, but also
"Unfair" and "We don't patronize" lists such as the ones enjoined in Gompers, see pp. 531-
32 supra. Those lists, he wrote, were simply advertisements "to make a strike or boycott
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and immoral publications, however true," lack educational value, he
was confident that the First Amendment also preserved the common-
law prohibitions against them.2 7 3
2. Other Scholarly Support for the Distinction
Cooley, Freund, and even Schroeder implicitly recognized the dis-
tinction between public and private speech, although none of them
identified or analyzed it with as much precision or sophistication as
Schofield. Alone among these scholars, Schofield connected the his-
torical background of the First Amendment to the public-private dis-
tinction. Yet Cooley and Schroeder, without making this explicit con-
nection, also maintained that the First Amendment was designed to
eliminate the English common-law crime of seditious libel, and both
stressed the importance of speech concerning public affairs.
Under the English rule, as summarized by Cooley, publications could
be punished because of their "tendency ... to excite disaffection with
the government, and thus induce a revolutionary spirit."274 This prin-
ciple, in Cooley's opinion, was always considered to be "unsuited to
the condition and circumstances of the people of America."2 75 The
First Amendment and similar provisions of state constitutions pre-
cluded the use of "repressive measures" to restrain free expression
and secured the right of free discussion of public affairs.2 7 6 On the
other hand, Cooley reasoned, the First Amendment does not apply to
speech on private topics unless there is a "reason in public policy
demanding protection to the communication." Therefore, common-
law prohibitions against speech affecting "private character" or "pub-
lic morals," including libel and obscenity, are consistent with consti-
tutional guarantees.
277
Schroeder was characteristically blunt in asserting the incompatibili-
more effective" and "are not exercises of the right of liberty of the press any more than
'U-Need-a-Biscuit,' or 'Drink Schlitz, the beer that made Milwaukee famous,' are exercises
of tile right." Id. at 105. But cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state
court disciplinary rule banning lawyer advertisements violates First Amendment protection
of "commercial speech"); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state may not ban advertising of retail prices of pre-
scription drugs).
273. Schofield, supra note 238, at 82.
274. T. COOLEY, suPra note 236, at 612.
275. Id. at 614-15. After acknowledging the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798, Cooley
contended: "Its constitutionality was always disputed by a large party, and its impolicy
was beyond question." He added that "it is impossible to conceive, at the present time,
of any such state of things as would be likely to bring about its re-enactment, or the
passage of any similar repressive statute." Id. at 613 (footnote omitted).
276. Id. at 604.
277. Id. at 615; see id. at 604.
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ty of seditious libel with the First Amendment. He noted that the
colonists who supported the American Revolution "had no doubt been
guilty of . . . seditious libel." The First Amendment, in Schroeder's
opinion, was the attempt by the generation that won the Revolution
to insure that future Americans would have the legal "right to ad-
vocate sedition and revolution." 27s More generally, the First Amend-
ment provides that "every idea, no matter how unpopular, so far as
the law is concerned, shall have the same opportunity as every other
idea, no matter how popular, to secure the public favor." Because
"only those ideas which were unpopular with the ruling classes
were ever suppressed," the First Amendment was designed to end
this "discrimination." 279 Yet even Schroeder acknowledged that the
First Amendment provides stronger safeguards for public than for
private speech. For example, he accepted Hamilton's test of truth
"for good motives and for justifiable ends" as "sufficient liberty" for
publications about the private affairs of private citizens, but rejected
its application to "matters of public concern, which usually must be
decided upon speculation and mere probability."
280
Although Freund believed that the law of seditious libel survived
the ratification of the First Amendment,28' he also implicitly sup-
ported the division of speech into matters of public and private con-
cern. Freund emphasized the importance of speech about public af-
fairs282 and made clear his view that the First Amendment does not
extend to communications lacking significant public interest. He
pointed out that the First Amendment does not legalize defamation,
obscenity, or speech corrupting "public morals." 2 3 At the same time,
Freund stressed his rather broad view of what constitutes public af-
fairs. "Freedom in the pursuit of art, literature and science is, as
a matter of history, bound up with the freedom of religion and of
speech and press, for it has practically never been opposed for other
than religious or political motives. '28 4 Obscenity, he maintained, should
never include "[b]ona fide scientific or scholarly treatment of offensive
278. T. SCHROEDER, On Suppressing the Advocacy of crime, in FREE SPEECH FOR RADI-
cuts 23, 33 (enl. ed. 1916) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder-Advocacy of Crime].
279. Schroeder-Unabridged "Freedom of Speech," supra note 260, at 42.
280. Schroeder-Malice in Criminal Libel, supra note 241, at 208-09; see pp. 568-69
infra (Schofield's discussion of Hamilton's test).
281. See pp. 569-70 infra (Freund's views on seditious libel).
282. E. FRtuND, supra note 28, at 509-13, 521.
283. Id. at 506.
284. Id. at 513. Freund concluded, contrary to the evidence of the case law, that "this
freedom is established to the fullest extent." Id. He cited the convictions of the Haymarket
anarchists, see p. 526 supra, and Johann Most, see pp. 543-44 supra, without criti-
cizing the decisions. E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 510-12.
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subjects," and the acknowledged state power to restrict indecent or im-
moral art and literature should be "exercised very sparingly."'8s
C. The Expanding Conception of Free Speech
Most of these authors also agreed that First Amendment guarantees,
although never subject to abridgment, can be broadened to accom-
modate society's desire for additional free expression. Schofield indi-
cated that speech previously considered private can become a matter
of public concern. He recognized, for example, that the Hicklin test
of obscenity could legitimately be criticized for preventing "truthful
and useful publications of educational value on sex hygiene, com-
mercialized vice, and other subjects, heretofore tabooed, but now
thought by many fit topics for public discussion."28G Schofield ap-
parently believed that either judicial construction or legislation could
extend the definition of public speech,2s7 but he insisted that only
a legislature could remove the restraint of truth and permit the pub-
lication of defamatory falsehoods about public issues.2 88
While analyzing the innovative formulation of liberty of the press
advanced by Alexander Hamilton during litigation under the Sedi-
tion Act of 1798, Schofield also approved increased protection for
speech on clearly private matters. Hamilton defined freedom of the
press as "the right to publish, with impunity, truth, with good mo-
tives, and for justifiable ends." 289 That test, which had been incor-
porated into the free speech clauses of most state constitutions, had
never been judicially construed..29 0 Schofield rejected its application
to speech on public affairs because he feared it would be used by a
legislature to revive the bad tendency test the First Amendment was
designed to abolish.291 But Schofield did approve Hamilton's test as
285. E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 514. Again, in an optimistic statement contrary to
the evidence, Freund concluded that "[t]hese principles are so fully recognised by the
practice of legislation that they stand unquestioned, even if lacking express judicial
confirmation." Id.
286. Schofield, supra note 238, at 82; cf. p. 549 supra (discussing Hand's criti-
cism of Hicklin in United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
287. Schofield, supra note 238, at 82.
288. Id. at 80 & n.2.
289. Hamilton first proposed this test during his argument in People v. Croswell, 3
Johns. Cas. 337, 393-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); see Schofield, supra note 238, at 89. Accord-
ing to Schofield, Hamilton's language "has been accepted as an extension of liberty of
the press to all matters of private concern as well as matters of public concern, obliterating
the distinction between the two. It is not clear that Hamilton so intended." Id. at 90.
290. Schofield observed that "[n]obody really knows or seems to care very much about
[its] true meaning." Schofield, supra note 238, at 95.
291. Id. at 92 n.2. Schofield cited the prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798 to
criticize the bad tendency test, id. at 86-87, and used the death of Socrates to illustrate
its dangers, id. at 92 n.2.
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a judicial limitation "[w]hen liberty of the press is extended to all
matters of private concern."2 92 This additional but properly con-
fined protection, Schofield believed, would safeguard desirable pri-
vate speech without unfairly exposing individuals to invasions of
privacy and other potential abuses of totally unrestrained freedom
of expression.2 93
Other prewar scholars, without focusing on the public-private dis-
tinction that so preoccupied Schofield, shared his receptivity to ex-
panding conceptions of free expression. According to Cooley, free
speech must always be "as broad as existed when the constitution
which guarantees it was adopted," but the First Amendment does not
preclude modifying the common law to protect additional speech.2 94
Schroeder acknowledged that the First Amendment could be inter-
preted either as permitting "more freedom than was contempora-
neously conceded" or as providing for an "unabridged freedom of ut-
terance." Even under the more limited theory of First Amendment
protection, Schroeder argued, the framers built in "budding con-
ceptions through which the idea of unabridged freedom of utterance
must develop."'205 The framers may not have intended to guarantee
absolute freedom of expression, but neither did they mean to freeze
the categories of protected speech in 1791.
Freund agreed that the meaning of the First Amendment should
not be limited to the framers' original conception. Although he did
not believe that the framers intended to abolish the common-law
crime of seditious libel,- 96 Freund argued that the First Amendment
should now be construed as precluding punishment for that crime.
He pointed out that the last prosecution for seditious libel in the
United States had probably taken place in 1805, rendering the crime
"practically obsolete."2 7 Many codifications of criminal law, he add-
292. Id. at 93.
293. Id. at 93-94.
294. T. COOLEY, supra note 236, at 615; see id. at 645 (expansion by legislature); p.
562 supra (expansion by courts).
295. Schroeder-Constitutional Construction, supra note 254, at 89-90.
296. E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 508. He pointed out that English constitutional
struggles over government prosecutions for libel, which took place at the same time as
the American Revolution, were resolved in Fox's Libel Act of 1792 by transferring the
determination of libel from the judge to the jury. The same principle, Freund claimed,
was accepted in many, and perhaps most, American jurisdictions. Id. at 507-08. Thus,
"freedom of political discussion and criticism," in the United States as well as in England,
"was sought to be secured, not by altering the substantive law of libel, but by providing
for a popular control of its administration." The enactment by Congress of the Sedition
Act of 1798, in Freund's opinion, further demonstrated that the First Amendment was
not understood to prohibit the common-law crime of seditious libel. Id. at 508.
297. Id. at 508-09. Freund published his book before the litigation in United States
v. Press Publishing Co., 219 U.S. 1 (1911), see p. 540 supra.
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ed, only covered defamations of individuals and did not refer to se-
dition. More importantly, "[c]ustom and public sentiment have come
to sanction the widest latitude of criticism of the government," al-
though it is generally impossible to prove the truth of such statements.
Freund hoped that "the long continued practice of toleration may
be accepted as sufficient warrant for modifying the interpretation of
the express constitutional guaranty to that effect." 298
D. The Rejection of Blackstone
Most of these prewar scholars went out of their way to point out
that their First Amendment interpretations were inconsistent with
Blackstone's limitation of free speech to the prohibition of prior re-
straints, 299 a position followed in many American cases and accepted
by the Supreme Court in Holmes' Patterson opinion.3 0 ° Schofield and
Schroeder complained that American judges made a significant his-
torical error in relying on Blackstone. Schofield called the courts "a
failure" for holding that the First Amendment and the free speech
clauses of state constitutions "are only declaratory of the anti-republi-
can English common law of the days of Blackstone." 301 They "seem
to have forgotten," he complained, "that the founders of the govern-
ment are not distinguished for their reception of the English com-
mon law but for their adaptation of the democratic leaning and ten-
298. E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 509.
299. According to Blackstone,
The liberty of the press . . . consists in laying no previous restraints upon publica-
tions, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published ....
But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which,
when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious ten-
dency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and
religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty.
4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 86, at "151-52. Although Blackstone linked his discussion
of previous restraints to his willingness to punish speech for its bad tendency, these scholars
attributed to him the rule on previous restraints and criticized the bad tendency theory
in more general terms.
Blackstone's Commentaries, an attempt to codify the common law of England, were
enormously successful on both sides of the Atlantic. L. FRIED.MtAN, supra note 22, at 16;
G. GILMORE, sulpra note 25, at 5. Blackstone became even more popular in the United
States than in England, particularly in the decades after the American Revolution, when
he provided a guide to the common-law tradition in a country without any significant
case precedents or legal literature of its own. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, at 88-89, 98.
There is a great deal of irony in the American reliance on Blackstone, for his Commen-
taries were "a conservative reaction to the fundamental changes which the English judges
were making in the apparently settled rules of English law." G. GILMORE, supra note
25, at 5.
300. See pp. 533-34 & note 86 supra.
301. Schofield, sufra note 238, at 115. He described Holmes' Patterson opinion as simply
"wrong." Id. at 110.
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dency of the constitutional side of it to a new career of popular
freedom and equal justice." 30 2 Schroeder agreed. "The whole con-
troversy over 'freedom of speech,' " Schroeder argued, "was a demand
that speakers might be free from . . .subsequent punishment as well
as previous restraint, . . . and it was that controversy which the fram-
ers of our constitutions intended to decide for all time." 03
Cooley used even more vivid language than Schroeder to condemn
the judicial adoption of Blackstone: "liberty of the press might be
rendered a mockery and a delusion, and the phrase itself a byword,
if, while every man was at liberty to publish what he pleased, the
public authorities might nevertheless punish him for harmless pub-
lications."304 The First Amendment guarantee, Cooley maintained,
provides "complete immunity from legal censure and punishment"
for all publications that are "not harmful" according to the standards
of the common law.305
Pound and Schofield also criticized Blackstone's definition of free
speech as an inflexible standard that prohibits too much as well as
prevents too little. According to Pound, if the legislature could im-
pose subsequent liability for any publication, "the result may easily
be to effectually prevent indirectly and so establish a censorship and
evade the guarantee."30 6 Similarly, Schofield reiterated that "if lib-
erty of the press in the First Amendment means anything it legalizes
published truth on all matters of public concern." 30 7 Yet Pound re-
jected the argument that the constitutional guarantee "absolutely pre-
cludes an injunction against speaking and writing under any circum-
stances." Such a prohibition, he pointed out, would mean that "the
constitution would forbid administrative prevention of false labels un-
der a pure food law. '" 3 8 Schofield also described as "untenable" deci-
302. Id. at 83.
303. Schroeder-Unabridged "Freedom of Speech," supra note 260, at 41. If the framers
intended the First Amendment to prohibit only prior restraints, Schroeder argued, "the
easiest way would have been to have had the Constitution say, 'No censor shall ever be
appointed,' or 'No previous restraints shall be put upon speech or press.'" T. SCHROEDER,
The Historical Interpretation of "Freedom of Speech and of the Press," in "OBscENE"
LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 206, 210 (1911) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder-His-
torical Interpretation].
304. T. COOLEY, supra note 236, at 604.
305. Id. at 605.
306. Pound-Equitable Relief, supra note 239, at 651.
307. Schofield, supra note 238, at 110.
308. Pound-Equitable Relief, supra note 239, at 654. Pound identified four kinds of
speech and writing for which subsequent liability had traditionally been imposed: picket-
ing and other "intimidations," "immoral or indecent" matter, contempts interfering with
justice, and material "dangerous to the conduct of military operations in time of war."
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sions that refused to issue injunctions against threatened union activity
or defamatory falsehoods solely because the courts assumed that any
prior restraint on publications violates the First Amendment. 0 9
E. The Limits of Protected Speech
In addition to their uniform rejection of Blackstone and their com-
mon emphasis on the importance of protecting communication on
matters of public concern, these scholars analyzed the boundaries of
free speech. Freund and Schroeder gave close attention to this cru-
cial issue, and other scholars addressed it in less specific terms.
1. The Direct Incitement Test
In an unusually detailed analysis that substantially foreshadowed
Hand's decision in Masses Publishing Co., 310 as well as his own sub-
sequent criticism of Holmes' opinion in Debs v. United States,321
Freund suggested direct incitement to crime and violence as the point
at which speech becomes illegal. "Agitation" is legal; "incitement"
is not. As Freund summarized the crux of his argument:
By the principles of the common law, the procurement of crime
is in itself a criminal act, and a conspiracy to commit a crime
is criminal though the end is never accomplished or even un-
dertaken. The prohibition of acts punishable at common law
is of course within the constitutional power of the state gov-
ernments. Therefore a statute may validly forbid all speaking
and writing the object of which is to incite directly to the com-
mission of violence and crime.312
On the other hand, Freund considered it "contrary to constitutional
liberty in a free state to exercise compulsory control over public
opinion and agitation, which refrains from the practice or incite-
ment of violence and from injury to private rights."
313
Id. at 651-53. Pound asserted that the difference between punishing these publications
and enjoining them "is not very substantial." Id. at 653-54. To allow one type of restraint
but not the other, he concluded, makes the guarantee of free speech "merely formal."
Id. at 654.
309. Schofield, supra note 238, at 105 n.1, 106 n.l. Schofield added that statutes or
municipal ordinances could constitutionally require prior censorship of motion pictures.
If the censors became "too officious" and "abridge[d] the freedom of the press under the
guise of guarding the public morals and promoting the general welfare," courts could
correct these invasions. Id. at 83.
310. 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); see note 415 infra.
311. Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 19 NEW REPUBLIC 13 (1919), re-
printed in 40 U. CH. L. REv. 239 (1973).
312. E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 510.
313. Id. at 10.
572
Vol. 90: 514, 1981
Prewar Free Speech
Freund recognized the difficulty in refining the meaning of incite-
ment, and attempted further clarification by applying it to "anar-
chistic propaganda. ' 314 He defined incitement to include the "glori-
fication" of previous crimes, and words not addressed to or aimed
at a specific person. But Freund did not view an assertion that crime
could be justified under certain stated conditions as an incitement.
313
Also, just as religious freedom "would have no meaning without the
liberty of attacking all religion, so the freedom of political discus-
sion is merely a phrase if it must stop short of questioning the funda-
mental ideas of politics, law and government." 316 Statements opposing
all government and arguing that its overthrow "cannot be accom-
plished otherwise than by force" are therefore constitutional. In fact,
Freund concluded that "it is impossible to strike at anarchism as a
doctrine without jeopardising valuable constitutional rights." Not
surprisingly, he considered unconstitutional many of the criminal-an-
archy laws enacted after the McKinley assassination.
31 7
Freund also repudiated the bad tendency theory as a test of in-
citement, even if the speech appeals to emotion rather than to rea-
son. 313 "It is of the essence of political liberty," he argued, "that it
may create disaffection or other inconvenience to the existing gov-
ernment, otherwise there would be no merit in tolerating it."3101 In
response to the argument that such appeals may encourage disorder
and even violence, he pointed out that "this was always the plea upon
which political agitation was formerly suppressed." Moreover, Freund
maintained that the commission of a crime by an adherent of a doc-
trine does not necessarily make an advocate of that doctrine guilty
of incitement. He believed that underlying "morbid brooding" over
social conditions, rather than speech, is frequently responsible for
criminal conduct by anarchists.320
Although neither Cooley nor Schofield set forth or elaborated as
precise a standard as direct incitement, their writings lent implicit
support to Freund's more developed position. Cooley's treatise,3 2 1
314. Id. at 510.
315. Id. at 511.
316. Id. at 509.
317. Id. at 513. Freund did not, however, find constitutional problems in the immi-
gration statute sustained by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279
(1904), because it did not "restrain the freedom of speech of anarchists residing in the
country." E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 512.
318. Id. at 511.
319. Id. at 510.
320. Id. at 511.
321. T. CooLEY, supra note 236.
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known principally as a legal defense of laissez-faire capitalism,3 22
advocated broad protection for political expression under the First
Amendment. Cooley would punish criticisms of government only
"when they are made in furtherance of conspiracy with the evident
intent and purpose to excite rebellion and civil war. 32 3 All other
political speech is free under the Constitution, "however sharp, un-
reasonable, and intemperate it might be." 3 '2 4 Cooley justified this po-
sition by a frank acknowledgment of social and economic differences.
He maintained that classes excluded from participating in govern-
ment are often the most vigorous in criticizing it. Judges and juries,
Cooley observed, generally belong "to the very classes who have es-
tablished the exclusion" under attack, and will have "preconceived"
views that the criticism is unreasonable. Further, they can only eval-
uate it after "the heat of the occasion has passed away" and there-
fore cannot appreciate the magnitude of the evil the critic perceived.
The danger of repression, Cooley added, is increased "in times of high
party excitement." For all these reasons, he reiterated, even "violent
discussion" of public affairs beyond "all the proper bounds of mod-
eration" is protected by the First Amendment.325
Schofield also implied that speech becomes subject to punishment
only when it advises illegal action. He argued that publications, like
other "overt acts," are illegal if "against peace and good order." But
consistent with his rejection of Blackstone and the crime of seditious
libel, he emphasized that publications are not illegal "simply be-
cause of their supposed bad tendency as opinion-makers." 326 Scho-
field did not set forth any standard for determining when speech
does violate "peace and good order"; however, he saw no consti-
tutional objection to statutes punishing anarchists for teaching, ad-
vising, or advocating "the murder of public officers, riot, and ar-
son," 327 or "the duty of killing any officer of the United States." 3'28
322. As the title of his treatise indicates, Cooley stressed the limitations of government
power. His treatise, first published in 1868 and reissued in seven later editions through
1927, achieved "unprecedented popularity" and "surpass[ed] even those of Kent and Story
in prestige and authority." C. JAcoBs, LAW WRITERS AND THE CouRTs 29 (1954). It became
"the most fecund source of laissez faire constitutional principles available during the
period." Id. at 30. Jacobs acknowledges that Cooley himself may not have intended or
anticipated the "capitalistic orientation" conservative law)ers and judges extracted from
his treatise, but it appears that Cooley easily acquiesced in this popular interpretation. Id.
323. T. CooLEY, supra note 236, at 613 (footnote omitted).
324. Id. at 615.
325. Id. at 614.
326. Schofield, supra note 238, at 78.
327. Id. at 88.
328. Id.
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Because Schofield examined the content of speech rather than its
tendency and acknowledged the constitutionality of statutes that pun-
ish the advocacy of crime, his approach suggested the distinction be-
tween agitation and incitement proposed more explicitly by Freund.
Moreover, foreshadowing one of the major subjects of debate among
lawyers and judges during the Espionage Act litigation, Schofield
warned that giving a jury a greater role in determining the legality
of speech "does not necessarily make for freedom of public discus-
sion of matters of public concern, either in normal times or in ex-
cited times, especially when the subject is politics, religion, a literary
or scientific work, or a work of art."329
2. Pound's Balancing Test
Although Pound favored greater protection for speech than some
contemporary courts provided, his interpretation of the First Amend-
ment allowed less leeway than Freund's incitement standard. Pound
favored an explicit balancing test weighing the "individual interest
in free belief and opinion" against the "social interest in the security
of social institutions."' 30 He maintained that the law can only punish
action and cannot reach "subjective states in and of themselves." Yet,
by defining "manifestations of belief" as actions331 and by favoring
their repression if they "threaten to overturn vital social institutions
or to weaken the power of the state,' 332 Pound seemed willing to
weigh the bad tendency of speech in determining its legality. Based
on these considerations, for example, he justified the federal suppres-
sion of antiwar statements during the Civil War.333
Pound also maintained that the nature of the audience should be
considered in the balance. The same social and economic differences
that led Cooley to propose wide latitude for free speech were, in
Pound's opinion, grounds for additional restrictions. Pound was par-
ticularly concerned about "the danger of mobs, which are controlled
by suggestion," in the large and congested cities populated by the
poor and ignorant. As a result, he approved restrictions on the time
and place of political speech in order to avoid "grave danger of
violence and disorder."334
329. Id. at 98-99.
330. Pound-Personality, supra note 239, at 454.
331. Id. at 456.
332. Id. at 454.
333. Id. at 456.
334. Id. at 455. Pound listed a number of cases that restricted free speech, identified
the social interest at stake, and, without attempting to make any distinctions among the
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3. Schroeder's Test of Actual Injury
Predictably, Theodore Schroeder's interpretation of the limits of
free speech was the most libertarian of the prewar period. Through-
out his voluminous writings, Schroeder emphasized and reiterated his
principal argument: all speech, including the advocacy of criminal
conduct, is protected by the First Amendment unless it directly re-
sults in an actual and material injury designated by the legislature
as a crime. In that event, the speaker "is to be punished for the sub-
sequent crime and his intentional participation in it, and not mere-
ly for his utterances, as such."335 Thus, a speaker could be punished
as an accessory to murder, arson, or any other crime that had al-
ready occurred, and his speech could be used as evidence of his re-
sponsibility for the resulting injury.330 But even the advocacy of trea-
son and assassination is protected under the First Amendment "so
long as no one was actually injured thereby.
337
Schroeder praised the framers for making "no exception for any
particular class of intellectual 'evils,' ,,338 a decision recognizing that
once one subject is suppressed all speech is threatened. 330 He at-
tacked the courts, as Justice Harlan criticized his colleagues in Patter-
son, for restricting freedom of discussion to "whatever a legislature
of mediocre attainments" considers in the "interest of the public
social and individual interests implicated or the dangers threatened, apparently approved
the results in all of the cases cited. Pound did not differentiate among Most's publications,
a public meeting led by a socialist, the distribution of handbills causing a threat of fire,
newspaper reports of crime, and Salvation Army parades. Id. at 455 n.99.
335. Schroeder-Advocacy of Crime, supra note 278, at 34. See T. SCHROEDER, Concern-
ing the Meaning of "Freedom of the Press," in "OBSCENE" LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 142, 151 (1911) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder-Meaning of "Freedon of the Press"];
Schroeder-Constitutional Construction, supra note 254, at 91; T. SCHROEDER, "Due Process
of Law" in Relation to Statutory Uncertainty and Constructive Offenses, Part I, in "OB-
SCENE" LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 343, 5,50-51 (1911) [hereinafter cited as Schroe-
der-Due Process, Part I]; Schroeder-Historical Interpretation, supra note 303, at 230.
To bolster his argument, Schroeder cited Thomas Jefferson's statement, embodied in
the Virginia Act of Toleration and "[e]ndorsed as authoritative" by the United States
Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States: " 'it is time enough for the rightful pur-
poses of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt
acts against peace and good order.'" 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878), quoted in Schroeder-Consti-
tutional Construction, supra note 254, at 89, and T. SCHROEDER, THE MEANING OF FREE
SPEECH (FOR PACIFISTS) 13 (1917). Jefferson and Reynolds were also invoked by the ap-
pellant in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). See note 112 supra.
336. Schroeder-Meaning of "Freedom of the Press," supra note 335, at 151; Schroeder
-Unabridged "Freedom of Speech," supra note 260, at 40.
337. Schroeder-Unabridged "Freedom of Speech," supra note 260, at 41.
338. T. SCHROEDER, Liberal Opponents and Conservative Friends of Unabridged Free
Speech, in FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS 54, 63 (eni. ed. 1916) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder
-Liberal Opponents and Conservative Friends].
339. Id. at 64.
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welfare." 340 Indeed, Schroeder maintained that this limitation on free
speech would make inexplicable the enactment of the First Amend-
ment "because no other opinions than such as had been deemed
contrary to the public welfare ever had been suppressed anywhere."
Schroeder pointed out that the language of the First Amendment
makes no exception for "the interest of the public welfare," and
insisted that courts could not properly read such a restriction into it.3
4 1
At times, Schroeder backed off from this strict standard, which pre-
cluded the punishment of speech unless a criminal act had occurred.
Speech that directly leads to an attempt, he occasionally conceded,
might constitutionally be punished even if the completed crime never
takes place.34 2 Moreover, Schroeder seemed to give additional ground
when he acknowledged the possibility that a legislature, consistent
with the First Amendment, might "regulate the imminent danger of
actual and material injury. ' 343 Speech could conceivably create "im-
minent danger" without producing an actual attempt.
Yet Schroeder made clear that this language, which bears a lin-
guistic similarity to Holmes' "clear and present danger" phrase in
Schench, should not be considered a restatement of the bad ten-
dency test that Schroeder repeatedly rejected.34 4 The "imminent dan-
ger," Schroeder stressed, can only be ascertained according to "known
physical laws. ' 345 Schroeder did not provide concrete examples of how
such determinations were to be made, but he asserted that "no form
of speech (including printing) can be penalized merely on the basis
of a jury speculation about the prospective psychological tendency of
the idea upon a hypothetical future reader." 340 He specifically criti-
340. Schroeder-Historical Interpretation, supra note 303, at 212; see Patterson v. Colo-
rado, 205 U.S. 454, 465 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting); pp. 540-41 supra.
341. Schroeder-Historical Interpretation, supra note 303, at 210.
342. Schroeder-Constitutional Construction, supra note 254, at 100; Schroeder-His-
torical Interpretation, supra note 303, at 207.
343. Schroeder-Constitutional Construction, supra note 254, at 113; see Schroeder-
Historical Interpretation, supra note 303, at 238.
344. See, e.g., T. SCHROEDER, "Due Process of Law" in Relation to Statutory Uncer-
tainty and Constructive Offenses, Part II, in "OBSCENE" LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
L \W 355, 362-63 (1911) [hereinafter cited as Schroeder-Due Process, Part 11]; Schroeder-
Unabridged "Freedom of Speech," supra note 260, at 42.
345. Schroeder-Constitutional Construction, supra note 254, at 113; see Schroeder-
Historical Interpretation, supra note 303, at 238.
346. Schroeder-Constitutional Construction, supra note 254, at 93; see Schroeder-
Due Process, Part I, supra note 335, at 350-51; Schroeder-Due Process, Part II, supra
note 344, at 362. The Articles of Incorporation of the Free Speech League stated that
one of the League's principal objects was "to preclude the punishment of any mere psycho-
lomgical offense." T. SCHROEDER, FREE SPEECH FOR RADICALS, supra note 241 (frontispiece).
Perhaps in response to the hostile judicial treatment of First Amendment claims, Schroe-
der also used the uncertainty inherent in psychological speculation to allege a connection
The Yale Law Journal
cized the Hicklin test of obscenity on this ground.34 7 For similar
reasons, Schroeder, like Pound, argued that the state of mind of a
speaker can provide no basis for forfeiting the protection of the First
Amendment. Leaving such a subjective determination to legislative
discretion or judicial speculation, he feared, would undermine the
Amendment's guarantees.
348
4. The Benefits of Libertarian Standards
Freund, Cooley, and Schroeder all stressed that libertarian stan-
dards for speech actually reduced the danger of violence and crime.
Freund tried to disarm potential critics by claiming that his position
"is based not upon generosity, but on sound policy." He asserted
that discussion of ideas "alone can render them harmless and re-
move the excuse for illegality by giving hope of their realisation by
lawful means. '' 349 As "consolation" to those favoring greater restric-
tions on free speech, Cooley, like Freund, reasoned that any evil likely
to result from his protective standard would "probably be less, and
its correction by public sentiment more speedy, than if the terrors
of the law were brought to bear to prevent the discussion." 350 Schroe-
der also tried to assure his readers that, by safeguarding free speech,
society protects the public welfare. Invoking the authority of "con-
servative friends of free speech" to taunt "liberal opponents,"3 51
Schroeder pointed out that "[t]he thought that the greatest liberty of
speech, even as to 'violent' language, is the best way to avert actual
between First Amendment and other constitutional prohibitions. As a check against "ar-
bitrary power," Schroeder pointed out, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments "requir[e] absolute certainty in the criteria of guilt." He maintained that
his conception of the First Amendment is the only way to "coordinate" freedom of ex-
pression with due process of law. Schroeder-Constitutional Construction, supra note
254, at 92-93; see Schroeder-Due Process, Part II, supra note 344, at 359-60. Schroeder
further argued that uncertain tests for defining guilt in free speech cases, by "delegating
to the courts a seeming authority for creating ex Post facto standards of judgment at the
trial of the accused," violate the Constitution. Schroeder-Constitutional Construction,
supra note 254, at 96. Uncertainty, moreover, is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment's
assurance that the defendant in all criminal prosecutions " 'shall be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation.'" Id. at 95-96. These arguments found expression in Roe's
brief in Fox. See Brief for Plaintiff-in-Error, supra note 91, at 15-17; pp. 534-35 & note 91
supra.
347. T. SCHROEDER, The Etiology and Development of Our Censorship of Sex-Litera-
ture, in "OBscENE" LITERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL Law 42, 55 (1911).
348. Schroeder-Liberal Opponents and Conservative Friends, supra note 338, at 67-68.
349. E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 510.
350. T. COOLEY, supra note 236, at 614.
351. Schroeder-Liberal Opponents and Conservative Friends, supra note 338, at 54-72.
"Conservative friends" included Lord Macaulay and Sir Leslie Stephen; "liberal oppo-
nents" included the editors of various liberal journals such as The Truth Seeker, The
Humanitarian Review, and The Public.
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violence is not original with me."352 He maintained that the highest
frequency of political assassination occurs in Tsarist Russia, while
the smallest number of violent incidents takes place in England,
which "probably has the greatest freedom of speech of any country
in the world." 353 Schroeder also referred to newspaper reports to sup-
port his claim that violence in the United States generally followed
the repression, and not the exercise, of free speech..
4
F. The Heritage of Prewar Scholarship
The work of these five authors illustrates the chasm that existed
before World War One between the world of legal scholarship and
the judiciary. The restrictive results and the analytic poverty of the
prewar decisions reflected the pervasive judicial hostility to the value
of free speech. Those cases bear little resemblance to recent First
Amendment adjudication. Much of the legal scholarship of that period,
on the other hand, hardly seems the product of an earlier age. Schol-
ars identified and addressed many of the issues that continue to gen-
erate judicial and scholarly commentary. From historical and func-
tional analyses of the purposes of the First Amendment, they derived
practical tests for determining its scope.
These prewar writings, generally ignored in contemporary judi-
cial decisions, are today largely forgotten. Chafee is now considered
the seminal scholar of the First Amendment.3 55 Chafee himself, how-
ever, relied on his scholarly predecessors, and Holmes and Brandeis
in turn relied on Chafee in developing a libertarian tradition in their
dissenting opinions in the 1920s. As a result, these prewar scholars
exerted belated yet significant influence on the development of First
Amendment theory in a more receptive era.
III. The Role of the Prewar Tradition in the Early Development
of Modem First Amendment Doctrine
The neglect by authors since Chafee of the prewar judicial and
scholarly treatment of free speech issues has created significant gaps
in our understanding of the early development of modern First
352. T. SCHROEDER, The Lawless Suppression of Free Speech in New York, in FrE
SPEECH FOR RADICALS 11, 20 (enl. ed. 1916).
353. Id. at 13.
354. Id. at 19-20; see p. 564 supra (Pound asserts that individual will fight if speech
repressed).
355. See Auerbach, The Patrician as Libertarian: Zechariah Chafee, Jr. and Freedom
of Speech, 42 NEw ENG. Q. 511, 531 (1969); Prude, Portrait of a Civil Libertarian: The
Faith and Fear of Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 60 J. Ams. HIST. 633, 655 (1973).
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Amendment doctrine. Justice Holmes' opinion in Schenck v. United
States,356 an Espionage Act prosecution, has become the starting point
for virtually all legal analysis of First Amendment adjudication in
the Supreme Court. Scholars have pointed out that the phrase "clear
and present danger" in Schenck, soon made popular by Chafee as a
libertarian standard, has inherent limitations as an analytical tool
for the protection of speech.357 Several have demonstrated that Holmes
derived this language from his longstanding views on the common
law of criminal attempts3 58 and have noticed that Holmes' opinion
in Schenck did not differ appreciably from his restrictive prewar
decisions in cases such as Davis v. Massachusetts, Patterson v. Colo-
rado, and Fox v. Washington.359 Many scholars have also observed
that Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States,360 and not his ma-
jority opinion in Schenck, marked the first time he advocated mean-
ingful judicial protection for speech.361
Although correct, these revisionist interpretations are incomplete.
They challenge Chafee's understanding of Schenck, but still accept
his position that no cases of significance preceded it. They therefore
fail to recognize that most decisions during and after World War
One, including Justice Holmes' opinions in Schenck, Frohwerk v.
United States,3 62 and Debs v. United States,363 demonstrate the con-
tinuing influence of the prewar tradition of hostility to free speech.
356. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
357. Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NoraE DAME LAW. 325, 356-
59 (1952); Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg
Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1174-82 (1970); Rogat, supra note 92, at 217; Wechsler,
Symposium on Civil Liberties, 9 AM. L. SCH. REV. 881, 887 (1941), reprinted in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1938-1962, at 628, 634 (1963).
Recent legal scholarship has so heavily criticized Justice Holmes that his once unchal-
lenged reputation as a civil libertarian has been replaced by a new orthodoxy empha-
sizing his indifference or hostility to civil liberties, particularly before his dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919). White, The Rise and Fall of Justice
Holmes, 39 U. Ci. L. REv. 51 (1971), provides an overview of this transformation. See S.
KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 181-202 (1956); Gunther, supra note *,
at 720, 739; Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the
Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. Am. HiST.
24, 25-26, 37 (1971); Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion (pts. 1-2), 15 STAN.
L. REv. 3, 254 (1962-1963).
358. Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes-1887-1936, 50 HARv. L. REV. 616, 621 (1937);
Ragan, supra note 357, at 29-31; Rogat, supra note 92, at 215-17.
359. S. KONEFSKY, supra note 357, at 185-93; Corwin, supra note 357, at 326-29; see
pP. 533-36 supra.
360. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919).
361. S. KONEFSKY, supra note 357, at 193; Gunther, supra note *, at 720, 741-43;
Kalven, supra note 24, at 238; Prude, supra note 355, at 640.
362. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
363. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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Chafee's classic article, Freedom of Speech in War Time,364 was pub-
lished between the Schenck and Abrams decisions. As part of his cam-
paign to provide greater tolerance for free speech, he obscured the
prewar cases while borrowing extensively from the prewar scholars.
Through an ingenious but unsupportable construction of Holmes'
Espionage Act decisions, Chafee also created the myth that Holmes
intended the words "clear and present danger" in Schenck to be a
libertarian principle of First Amendment adjudication.365 As Holmes,
and especially Brandeis, rapidly became more sensitive to free speech
concerns, they eagerly accepted and promoted the erroneous con-
clusions of Chafee's article.3 66
A. The Selective Draft Law Cases
Antiwar speeches and publications frequently prompted govern-
ment prosecutions under the Selective Draft Law and the Espionage
Act. Three Selective Draft Law decisions by the Supreme Court in
1918 carried on the prewar tradition of ignoring First Amendment
issues. In these cases, antiwar speakers were convicted for inducing
or conspiring to induce eligible persons not to register.367 The briefs
of the defendants focused on the constitutionality of the draft law,
on the adequacy of the indictments and the evidence, and on matters
of criminal procedure.368 Yet they did not rely on the First Amend-
ment, even though, as the brief for Emma Goldman and Alexander
Berkman contended, a judge and a jury caught up in the "war hys-
teria at the time" had simply convicted two notorious anarchists for
repeating the theories and beliefs on a public question that they
364. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3. The June 1919 issue
of the Harvard Law Review arrived at the Library of Congress on August 19, 1919.
365. Id. at 966-69. Chafee tempered his interpretation of Schenck somewhat by con-
ceding that Holmes had not emphasized the social interest behind free speech and had
given undue deference to perceived military needs. Id. at 968-69.
366. A separate article, which I intend to publish, is necessary to provide a complete
account of the transformation in the approach of Holmes and Brandeis to First Amend-
ment issues, and of the related transformation of "clear and present danger" from its
origins in the common law of criminal attempts to its status as a libertarian standard of
constitutional interpretation. These transformations are important in the context of this
article because they complete the story of the prewar tradition and help explain why that
tradition has now been forgotten.
367. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918) (inducement); Kramer v. United
States, 245 U.S. 478 (1918) (conspiracy); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918)
(conspiracy). The Selective Draft Law dealt with the mechanics of raising an army. See
Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (expired 1919). The prohibitions against induce-
ment and conspiracy were contained in the contemporary criminal code.
368. Brief for Plaintiffs in Error, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918);
Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiffs-in-Error, Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918)
[hereinafter cited as Goldman Brief].
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had expressed during the past twenty years.36 9 Chief Justice White's
opinions affirming the convictions at no point referred to free speech.3 7
B. The Espionage Act Cases
A year later, the Supreme Court considered very similar issues in
its first Espionage Act3 71 decisions: Schenck v. United States,372 Sugar-
man v. United States,373 Frohwerk v. United States,374 and Debs v.
United States.37 5 The government charged that antiwar articles and
speeches by the defendants caused or attempted to cause insubordina-
tion in the armed forces or obstruction of recruitment or enlistment.
All of the briefs, unlike those filed just a year earlier in the Selective
Draft Law cases, included First Amendment challenges to the con-
victions. Probably because the prosecution and conviction of Debs,
the most prominent socialist in the country, had aroused widespread
popular attention,376 the briefs in his case provided the fullest dis-
cussion of freedom of speech.377
1. Defendants' First Amendment Arguments
The major First Amendment issue posed by these Espionage Act
cases involved two related disputes: whether the statute made speech
punishable for its bad tendency and whether this question is of con-
stitutional significance. The main brief for Debs criticized reliance
on the "indirect effect" or the "reasonable and natural consequences"
369. Goldman Brief, supra note 368, at 18-20.
370. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918); Kramer v. United States, 245
U.S. 478 (1918); Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918).
371. The Act provided that
whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause
insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces
of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service
of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both;
Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a)
(1976)). It also provided the same penalties for a conspiracy to violate that section. Id. § 4
(current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2388(b) (1976)).
372. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
373. 249 U.S. 182 (1919).
374. 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
375. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
376. See R. GINGER, THE BENDING CRoss 353-84 (1949) (biography of Debs).
377. Alfred Bettman and John Lord O'Brian, who wrote the government's briefs in
all four of the Espionage Act cases, and Seymour Stedman, the lead attorney for Sugarman
and Debs, devoted their main efforts to the Debs case. In addition, Gilbert Roe of the
Free Speech League chose Debs as the case in which to file an amicus brief. See notes
378, 379, 385 infra.
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of speech as a basis for finding specific criminal intent under the
Espionage Act. It warned that such reliance would confine antiwar
politics to times of peace, restrict discussion of this vital subject of
public policy to high government officials, and create a "caricature"
of the First Amendment.37s Gilbert Roe's amicus brief for Debs, con-
sistent with the views of the Free Speech League and Roe's prewar
activity in free speech cases, underlined the danger of the bad ten-
dency theory, which he contended was unconstitutional. The con-
viction of Debs, and the similar plight of many other Espionage Act
defendants in federal district courts, demonstrated to Roe that a judge
or jury could punish a speaker for a speech or article "in the ab-
sence of any evidence that it produced a particular effect" simply
because they believed "it would have a tendency to produce the re-
sults complained of." If the Court upheld this approach in Debs,
Roe pointed out, Congress could proscribe the use of unidentified
language subsequently found to have had a tendency to cause a pro-
hibited effect, or specific language deemed in itself to have a bad
tendency.
3 79
In addition to criticizing the bad tendency test, the briefs for the
defendants in the Espionage Act cases raised broader policy ques-
tions concerning freedom of speech and relied on the treatises of
Cooley and Freund. Schenck's attorneys, citing Cooley as authority,
maintained that the First Amendment protects free discussion of
public affairs, including the "scrutiny and condemnation" of those
in power. "Absolutely unlimited discussion," they asserted, spreads
the truth and permits citizens to exercise their rights intelligently.380
They stressed,381 as did Stedman in his Debs brief,38 2 the importance
of allowing the free expression of minority views. Several of the briefs
claimed that free speech encompasses more than the prohibition against
378. Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 84, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
[hereinafter cited as Stedman Brief for Debs].
379. Brief of Gilbert E. Roe, as Amicus Curiae, at 16, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Roe Amicus Brief for Debs].
Linde, suprra note 357, at 1171, and Rogat, supra note 92, at 217, discuss the difference
between these two forms of legislation. The Supreme Court addressed this distinction in
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 654, 670-71 (1925) (upholding statute prohibiting
"[aldvocacy of criminal anarchy" and distinguishing Espionage Act); cf. Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 378-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (statute creates only
rebuttable presumption that specified utterances may constitutionally be punished).
380. Brief of Plaintiffs in Error at 6-7, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Schenck].
381. Id. at 8 (importance of "honest criticism of the majority by the minority").
382. Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 378, at 62 ("degree of tolerance of minority
sentiments" is test of political freedom).
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prior restraints3 3 and argued, referring to Cooley, Freund, and the
experience under the Sedition Act of 1798, that the First Amend-
ment made the crime of seditious libel obsolete.
3 4
2. The Government's Response
The government relied on the prewar judicial tradition in its re-
ply briefs. It argued that the bad tendency test was necessary to save
"the Nation" from being "powerless to punish any incitement to law-
lessness, however intentional and however effective, so long as it is
concealed in veiled, indirect, or rhetorical language. '"38 5 After point-
ing out that Blackstone's position constituted the prevailing inter-
pretation of the First Amendment and had been sustained by the
Supreme Court in Patterson v. Colorado, the government conceded
that this definition might be unnecessarily restrictive.38 6 It acknowl-
edged that "[s]ome authorities" maintain that the First Amendment
protects all speech not considered illegal at common law.
38 7 Yet the
government, ignoring the references in the defendants' briefs, incor-
rectly stated that "all authorities" recognize seditious speech as among
the harmful utterances punishable at common law and therefore be-
yond the protection of the First Amendment.388 It also argued that
the "right of self-preservation," identified by the Supreme Court in
Turner v. Williams, supported the validity of the Espionage Act.
38 0
3. The Unanimous Opinions by Holmes and Brandeis
Holmes or Brandeis wrote a unanimous opinion in all four of the
first group of Espionage Act decisions, affirming the convictions and
383. Brief for Schenck, supra note 380, at 6; Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 378,
at 86; Roe Amicus Brief for Debs, supra note 379, at 23-26. Roe observed that Professor
St. George Tucker, in his 1803 American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, stated
that freedom of the press requires "an exemption, not only from the previous inspection
of licencers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws." Id. at 44 (quoting Tucker, Appen-
dix to Volume First. Part Second, Note G at 20, to W. BLACKSTONE, COIMENTARiFES (S.
Tucker ed. 1803)) (emphasis added by Roe).
384. Statement, Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error by Frans E. Lindquist at
29-31, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note
378, at 74-76, 85; Roe Amicus Brief for Debs, supra note 379, at 32-42.
385. Brief for the United States at 72, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) [here-
inafter cited as Brief for United States in Debs]; see Brief for the United States, in Reply
to Brief of Gilbert E. Roe, as Amicus Curiae, at 2-3, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919) [hereinafter cited as Reply to Roe].
386. Brief for United States in Debs, supra note 385, at 80-81. The brief quoted at
length, id. at 84-88, from Pound's specific discussion of prior restraints and his general
treatment of free speech in Pound-Equitable Relief, supra note 239, at 650-54.
387. Brief for United States in Debs, supra note 385, at 81. The government quoted
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897), see pp. 539-40 supra. Brief for United
States in Debs, supra note 385, at 70; Reply to Roe, supra note 385, at 17.
388. Brief for United States in Debs, supra note 385, at 81.
389. Id. at 90; see p. 538 supra.
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rejecting the defendants' First Amendment claims. Brandeis accepted
the government's suggestion to dismiss Sugarman for lack of juris-
diction because the case did not present any substantial constitu-
tional question.390 He thereby neglected the underlying First Amend-
ment issues,391 as did so many Supreme Court decisions before the war.
Holmes devoted only slightly more attention to the First Amend-
ment in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs. He briefly referred to it in
one paragraph in Schenck,3 92 and then relied on Schenck in dismiss-
ing First Amendment claims in Frohwerk393 and Debs.394 He never
mentioned the treatises of Cooley and Freund, authorities stressed in
the main brief for Debs and cited in several of the other briefs in
the Espionage Act cases. Instead, Holmes focused on questions of
criminal law,393 and in all three cases, using an analysis bearing a
remarkable similarity to his prewar decisions, predicated punishment
on the tendency of speech.39 6
Holmes characterized Schenck's position as contending that the
First Amendment protects the distribution of antiwar circulars even
if they have the "tendency" to obstruct recruitment.397 Holmes dis-
agreed: "If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency
and the intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no
ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime."
398
In Frohwerk, Holmes found a conviction justified by possible innu-
390. 249 U.S. 182, 185 (1919).
391. Brandeis decided to dismiss Sugarman for reasons different from those that the
government suggested, thus further obscuring the free speech claim. Compare Brief for
the United States at 36-37 (punishment of attempts, through speech, to violate valid
statute is necessarily constitutional) with 249 U.S. at 184-85 (judge's instructions had "clear-
ly embodied" substance of defendant's requests regarding constitutional rights and free
speech). Nor did Brandeis respond to any of the extensive constitutional arguments in
Stedman's brief for Debs, even though Stedman concluded his brief for Sugarman by
referring explicitly to them. See Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 21.
392. 249 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919).
393. 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
394. 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919).
395. Kalven observed that Holmes considered Debs "a routine criminal appeal." Kalven,
supra note 24, at 238. Gunther would apply this comment "to the entire spring 1919
trilogy." Gunther, supra note *, at 736 n.83.
396. "In the final analysis," Corwin pointed out, "the doctrine announced in the
Schenck case is indistinguishable from that presented in Fox." Corwin, supra note 357,
at 329.
397. 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
398. Id. at 52. Holmes, citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418
(1911), see pp. 531-32 supra, stressed that free speech does not even "protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force." 249
U.S. at 52. However, he did retreat from his position in Patterson. "It may well be," he
acknowledged, "that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not
confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main pur-
pose, as intimated in Patterson." Id. at 51-52; see pp. 533-34 supra.
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endo and gave metaphorical expression to the bad tendency test by
maintaining that "a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame."'390
Sustaining the conviction in Debs, Holmes stated that the jury could
have found that "the opposition was so expressed that its natural and
intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting. '"400 According to
Holmes, the principle that the tendency of words, combined with
other evidence, indicates the speaker's intent "is too well established
and too manifestly good sense to need citation of the books." 401 Holmes'
initial Espionage Act opinions, therefore, extended the prewar tra-
dition of relying on the bad tendency of speech to deny free speech
claims.
C. Zechariah Chafeep Jr., and the Selective
Use of the Prewar Tradition
The publication of Chafee's Freedom of Speech in War Time in
the June 1919 issue of the Harvard Law Review402 provided the es-
sential link between the prewar scholarship and the postwar judi-
cial tradition initiated by Justices Holmes and Brandeis soon after this
article appeared. Chafee indicated that the courts had not previously
confronted free speech issues in any significant way, but he did in-
corporate into his article, often by explicit reference, many of the
major principles that Cooley, Freund, Pound, Schofield, and Schroe-
der had developed at length before the war. Holmes and Brandeis,
who began to dissent in First Amendment cases only months later,
turned to Chafee in much the same manner as Chafee had relied on
his scholarly predecessors. Thus the theoretical foundations for mod-
em First Amendment doctrine, despite the overwhelming judicial
tradition of hostility to free speech, emerged from the thinking of
the prewar scholars, who were generally unheeded and perhaps not
even noticed by contemporary judges.
1. Chafee's Reliance on the Prewar Scholars
Consistent with the emphasis of the prewar scholarship and in lan-
guage reminiscent of Schofield, Chafee asserted that the First Amend-
ment "is a declaration of national policy in favor of the public dis-
399. 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919). In Frohwerk, Holmes cited Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275 (1897), see pp. 539-40 supra, for the proposition that the First Amendment was
"not . . intended to give immunity for every possible use of language." 249 U.S. at 206.
400. 249 U.S. 211, 214-15 (1919).
401. Id. at 216.
402. Chafee--Freedom.of Speech in War Time, supra note 3.
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cussion of all public questions. ' 40 3 In a paragraph that he privately
described as "key, ' 40 4 Chafee explained that "[t]he true meaning of
freedom of speech" is to foster society's interest in "the discovery and
spread of truth on subjects of general concern."
40 5
Chafee followed the example of his scholarly predecessors by cit-
ing the history of the First Amendment to support his understand-
ing of its purpose. He observed that Blackstone was "not interpreting
a constitution but trying to state the English law of his time," which
itself had changed after the enactment of Fox's Libel Act in 1792.406
He quoted at length from Cooley's criticisms of Blackstone and called
them "unanswerable. '4 7 Without direct citation, Chafee also accepted
the view of Pound and Schofield that Blackstone at times went "al-
together too far in restricting state action" and at other times gave
"very inadequate protection to the freedom of expression."4 s0 Chafee,
as had Cooley, Schofield, and Schroeder, concluded that the free speech
clauses of the federal and state constitutions were designed to abolish
the common-law crime of seditious libel.40 9 The Sedition Act of 1798,
Chafee maintained, "revive[d]" this crime and "proved so disastrous"
that no similar legislation was enacted during the next century.
410
Writing also in the tradition of the prewar scholars, Chafee de-
nounced the evils of the bad tendency test. After the abolition of cen-
403. rd. at 934. For Schofield's similar views, see Schofield, supra note 238, at 91,
quoted at p. 563 supra.
404. Statement of Z. Chafee, Jr., about his work on Freedom of Speech (Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 29, Folder 22, Harvard Law School Library) [hereinafter cited as
Chafee Statement]. Chafee repeated this paragraph from an earlier article in The New
Republic, Chafee-Freedom of Speech, supra note 3, at 67, as he noted in his longer
article, Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 957 n.80.
405. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 956.
406. Id. at 939. Chafee also noted that Blackstone had been criticized as "an anti-
republican lawyer" by one of his English contemporaries. Id. at 939 n.24 (citing Schofield,
supra note 238, at 85); see note 299 supra (discussing Blackstone in historical context).
407. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 940.
408. Id. at 939-40; see pp. 571-72 supra (discussing Pound and Schofield on Black-
stone). Chafee, writing in the aftermath of the war, was able to provide a dramatic illus-
tration of the practical inadequacy of the rigid application of Blackstone. "The prohi-
bition of previous restraint," he pointed out, "would not allow the government to prevent
a newspaper from publishing the sailing dates of transports or the number of troops in
a sector." Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 939. Chief Justice
Hughes cited these examples as exceptions to the general prohibition against prior re-
straints. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
409. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 946-47; see id. at 946
(quoting Schofield's similar conclusion). Chafee, like most of the prewar scholars, did
acknowledge "that certain forms of utterance, which have always been crimes or torts at
common law, are not within the scope of the free speech clauses." Id. at 943. Yet he also
agreed that "the meaning of the First Amendment did not crystallize in 1791." Id. at
954; see pp. 569-70 supra (discussing support by prewar scholars for expanding con-
ception of free speech).
410. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 953.
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sorship, he pointed out, opponents of free speech joined to this test
the doctrines of indirect causation and constructive intent. Under
these doctrines "words can be punished for a supposed bad tendency
long before there is any probability that they will break out into
unlawful acts" and intent can be inferred "from the bad tendency
of the words on the ground that a man is presumed to intend the
consequences of his acts. ' '411 Drawing on the history of prosecutions
for sedition in Great Britain and the United States during the late
eighteenth century, Chafee concluded "that the most essential ele-
ment of free speech is the rejection of bad tendency as the test of a
criminal utterance." 412 Chafee also observed, as had several scholars
before the war, that transferring the determination of liability from
judge to jury, the accomplishment of Fox's Libel Act, provides mean-
ingful protection only for popular criticisms of government. 413 Thus,
for Chafee, the essential question was "not, who is judge of the
criminality of an utterance, but what is the test of its criminality."
414
Chafee derived his test from an artful combination of Pound's bal-
ancing approach and the direct incitement standard employed by Hand
in Masses Publishing Co. 4 15 Citing Pound's earlier discussion,
410 he
identified individual and social interests in free speech as well as
social interests in restricting speech to preserve public safety. Chafee
also agreed with Pound that those interests must be balanced in or-
der to define the boundary between protected and unlawful speech.
417
411. Id. at 949.
412. Id. at 953; see id. at 948.
413. Id. at 949. The right to a jury trial, Chafee noted, was "of much less value in
times of war or threatened disorder when the herd instinct runs strong, if the opinion
of the defendant is highly objectionable to the majority of the population, or even to
the particular class of men from whom or by whom the jury are drawn." Id. He re-
ferred specifically to the problems of jury selection in the prosecution of radicals. Id.
at 949-50 & n.60; cf. note 296 supra (discussing Freund's interpretation of Fox's Libel Act).
414. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 948; cf. p. 575
supra (discussing similar views of Schofield).
415. In Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir.
1917), Judge Learned Hand rejected the bad tendency approach and promoted "direct
incitement to violent resistance," id. at 540, as the proper standard for judging speech
under the Espionage Act. Although Hand acknowledged the possibility that Congress could
constitutionally "forbid the mails to any matter which tends to discourage the successful
prosecution of the war," id. at 538, he repeatedly made clear his view that the Espionage
Act itself did not permit such a broad construction. "If one stops short of urging upon
others that it is their duty or their interest to resist the law," Hand wrote, "it seems
to me one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation." Id. at 540; see id.
at 539-42 (repeated rejection of bad tendency doctrine); Gunther, supra note 0, at 724-29,
748-49 (analyzing Hand's opinion and his subsequent correspondence with Chafee).
416. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 958 n.85 (citing Pound
-Personality, supra note 239, at 453-56).
417. Id. at 959-60. Compare id. at 959 with Pound-Personality, supra note 239, at 453-
54. Chafee asserted that most judges construing the Espionage Act considered only the in-
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Yet Chafee applied the technique of balancing to reach a very dif-
ferent result from Pound, who supported the punishment of hostile
criticism of the government during the Civil War and limitations on
"free expression of political opinions" by "ignorant" masses in con-
gested cities.418 Chafee, relying instead on Hand's decision in Masses
Publishing Co. and echoing Freund's approach in The Police Power,419
fixed the boundary line "close to the point where words will give
rise to unlawful acts." 420 "The real issue in every free-speech con-
troversy," Chafee concluded, is "whether the state can punish all words
which have some tendency, however remote, to bring about acts in
violation of law, or only words which directly incite to acts in vio-
lation of law."
421
2. Chafee's Misrepresentation of Judicial Precedent
Unlike the prewar scholars, however, Chafee ignored the tradition
of judicial hostility to free speech that relied so heavily on the bad
tendency theory. Before writing his article, Chafee had read every
free speech case decided prior to 1916.422 He had also read the pre-
war scholars who criticized contemporary judicial decisions.42 3 Yet
Chafee maintained that the bad tendency test had disappeared in the
United States after the adoption of the First Amendment, only to be
"revived" by the prosecutions and decisions under the Espionage Act.
According to Chafee, the Sedition Act of 1798 represented the only
attempt in the history of the United States prior to 1917 to apply
the bad tendency doctrine.424
Chafee peremptorily dismissed recent prewar decisions incompatible
with his libertarian ideology. He rarely mentioned those cases and
never discussed any in detail.42 5 Instead, he lamented that prior free
dividual interest in free speech, and ignored the more important social interest. Pound
claimed that the individual interest had not been sufficiently recognized by public opinion.
But both agreed on the central point: free speech had at times suffered unduly at the
expense of social interests in security and order.
413. Pound-Personality, supra note 239, at 455; see p. 575 supra.
419. E. FREUND, supra note 28, at 509-13; see pp. 572-73 supra. Hand's decision bore
strong resemblances to Freund's discussion in The Police Power, as Stedman observed.
Stedman Brief for Debs, supra note 378, at 73.
420. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 960; see id. at 960-62.
421. Id. at 948.
4122. Chafee-Thiry-Five Years, supra note 22, at 2; Chafee Statement, supra note 404.
423. Chafee Statement, supra note 404.
424. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 952.
,425. For example, Chafee did not refer to Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), or
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904), two key prewar decisions that addressed free
speech claims, see pp. 534-38 supra. He did mention Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), and
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), see pp. 532-34, 539-40 supra (discussing these
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speech cases lacked sufficient rigor and were "too few, too varied in
their character, and often too easily solved." A number of these un-
identified precedents were "of very dubious value," Chafee added,
because they totally ignored "the economic and political facts of our
time.' 426 He concluded that earlier decisions, by failing to formulate
any principle for drawing "a boundary line around the right of free
speech," left the judges who decided the Espionage Act cases without
any guidance and therefore "allowed some of them to impose stan-
dards of their own and fix the line at a point which makes all oppo-
sition to this or any future war impossible."
427
Chafee never acknowledged that the Espionage Act decisions he at-
tacked were consistent with the prewar cases he largely ignored and
his predecessors heavily criticized. Despite the pervasive reliance on
the bad tendency theory in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, Chafee
reached the entirely unsupportable conclusion that Holmes had used
the words "clear and present danger" in Schenck to make "the pun-
ishment of words for their bad tendency impossible." According to
Chafee, Holmes in Schenck "substantially agrees with the conclusion
reached by Judge Hand, by Schofield, and by investigation of the
history and political purpose of the First Amendment." 42s Chafee
also did not point out that the prewar cases actually drew a tight
boundary line that excluded, through the use of the bad tendency
theory, much speech he thought should be protected. Such conces-
sions would have weakened, perhaps irreparably, the libertarian ar-
gument he was trying to construct, particularly because the prewar
decisions could not be attributed to the excesses of wartime excite-
ment. It was Chafee, not the judges he criticized, who tried to im-
pose a standard of his own. But he, unlike the judges, advocated one
that would protect dissent even in time of war. In his discussion of
the crucial bad tendency theory, Chafee allowed the passion of his
three cases). Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 937 n.10, 938 n.19,
939 n.25, 958 n.83. He also cited some prewar decisions by state courts. Id. at 940 n.29,
941 n.30.
Chafee's discussion of the relationship between the First Amendment and the postal
power further illustrates his ingenious and disingenuous use of precedent. Chafee noted
that the exclusion of publications from the mails constituted prior restraint and "ought
to be subject to the requirements of free speech and due process of law." Id. at 970. He
then claimed, citing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), and Public Clearing House v.
Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904), see pp. 526-27 & note 47 supra, that "there are dicta of the
Supreme Court that [the postal power] is not unlimited." Chafee-Freedom of Speech in
War Time, supra note 3, at 970 &- n.133. This claim, to say the least, minimizes to a
misleading extent the insensitivity to free speech manifested by the postal cases, including
the two he cited.
426. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 944-45.
427. Id. at 959.
428. Id. at 967.
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personal commitment to a libertarian construction of the First Amend-
ment to overwhelm disinterested scholarship.42 9
D. The First Amendment Dissents by Holmes and Brandeis
The decisions of the Supreme Court majority from Abrams v.
United States through Whitney v. California extended the tradition
of judicial hostility to free speech. 430 The majority rejected all free
speech claims, combining visceral hostility to radical manifestations
of free speech 43' with doctrinal reliance on the bad tendency theory.4 32
The factual variety of the earlier cases was missing during the post-
war period, when prosecutions of anarchists and socialists monopo-
lized First Amendment litigation. But in analysis and result, nothing
had changed.
In one crucial respect, however, the Supreme Court decisions of
the 1920s did depart from their predecessors. Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, beginning with their dissent in A brains, developed a theory
of First Amendment interpretation that relied heavily on Chafee's
writings and, especially as reformulated by Chafee, on many of the
libertarian principles of prewar scholarship. Before the war, only an
occasional dissent or concurrence challenged the monotony of re-
strictive, unanimous decisions. The opinions of Holmes and Brandeis
from Abrams through Whitney, by contrast, afforded meaningful the-
oretical protection for free speech.4 33
429. Others have made analogous observations. See Auerbach, supra note 355, at 522-23;
Gunther, supra note *, at 748; Prude, supra note 355, at 641-42.
430. Although these opinions relied particularly on the Espionage Act trilogy of
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, they also cited prewar precedents with some frequency. Gil-
bert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1920), cited Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907),
see p. 531 supra. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co.
v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 411 (1921), cited the post office litigation from Ex Parte Jackson,
96 U.S. 727 (1877), through Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913), see pp.
526-29 supra. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-6S (1925), cited Robertson, Patterson,
Fox, and several lower court cases from before World War One, including People v. Most,
171 N.Y. 423, 64 N.E. 175 (1902), see p. 544 supra. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 369, 371 (1927), cited Fox and referred generally to the cases cited in Gitlow.
431. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v.
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 416 (1921); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 331 (1920); Schaefer
v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 477, 479 (1920).
432. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 669, 671 (1925); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 244 (1920); Schaefer v.
United States, 251 U.S. 466, 479 (1920).
4133. In Gilbert, Holmes concurred in the result while Brandeis dissented. 254 U.S.
325, 334 (1920). In Whitney, Brandeis wrote a concurring opinion in which Holmes joined.
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927). As Bork has observed, this concurrence was really a dissent.
Bork, supra note 261, at 23. In all the other major First Amendment cases beginning with
Abrams, Brandeis and Holmes dissented together, except in Milwaukee Social Democratic
Publishing Company, in which they wrote separate dissents. 255 U.S. 407, 417 (1921)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 436 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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In Abrams v. United States, decided only eight months after Schenck,
Sugarman, Frohwerk, and Debs, and only five months after the pub-
lication of Freedom of Speech in War Time, Holmes joined Chafee
in recognizing truth as "the ultimate good desired." Just as Chafee
stressed open discussion of differing views as the best method for sift-
ing out truth from falsehood, Holmes maintained that truth "is better
reached by free trade in ideas." 434 In his initial Espionage Act opin-
ions, Holmes had ignored the government's argument that the com-
mon law of seditious libel survived the First Amendment; in A brains,
consistent with the consensus of Chafee and many earlier scholars,
he abruptly rejected this argument, stating simply that "[h]istory
seems to me against the notion." 435 In addition, Holmes first appeared
to identify in Abrams the distinction between public and private
speech that lay behind much of the prewar scholarly commentary on
the First Amendment. Holmes indicated that "where private rights
are not concerned," Congress has less power to punish speech. 436 More
generally, he included language that demonstrated, as his prior opin-
ions had not, an appreciation for the value of free speech. Holmes
now maintained that "Congress certainly cannot forbid all effort to
change the mind of the country, ' 437 and he referred to the First
Amendment as a "sweeping command, '438 allowing only rare excep-
tions. No similar language had appeared in Schenck, Frohwerh, or
Debs, or in Davis, Patterson, or Fox.
Brandeis, the author of most First Amendment dissents in the de-
cade after Abrams, continued this incorporation of libertarian, schol-
arly views. In Schaefer v. United States, the first dissent he wrote,
Brandeis stressed the importance of free expression of minority views,
a concern that Chafee and the prewar scholars had identified. He
warned that "an intolerant majority, swayed by passion or by fear,
may be prone in the future, as it has often been in the past, to
stamp as disloyal opinions with which it disagrees."4 3 9 Giving a jury
power to construe speech as false statements of fact rather than as
434. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
435. Id. Holmes supported his view on seditious libel by pointing out that "the United
States through many years had shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by
repaying fines that it imposed." Id. It is plausible, as Chafee suggested, that Holmes
derived this justification from Roe's amicus brief in Debs. Letter from Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., to Judge George W. Anderson (Dec. 5, 1922) (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 14,
Folder 1, Harvard Law School Library); see Roe Amicus Brief for Debs, supra note 379,
at 40-42. This argument was not made in the briefs in Abrans.
436. 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919).
437. Id.
438. Id. at 631.
439. 251 U.S. 466, 495 (1920); see id. at 482.
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expressions of opinion, he added in Pierce v. United States, "would
practically deny members of small political parties freedom of criti-
cism and of discussion in times when feelings run high and the ques-
tions involved are deemed fundamental."4' 40 In Whitney v. California,
he reiterated that the First Amendment was designed to guard against
"the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities." ' 41
Brandeis recognized as well the relationship between free speech
and democratic government identified by so much of the previous
legal scholarship. Even intemperate language, he stressed in Pierce,
should not be construed to forfeit the "fundamental right of free
men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new
institutions. ' 42 "In frank expression of conflicting opinion," he add-
ed in Gilbert v. Minnesota, "lies the greatest promise of wisdom in
governmental action; and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest
peril. ' '44 3 The search for truth that Chafee emphasized in his "key"
paragraph, 444 moreover, was almost identically expressed by Brandeis
in Whitney, in which he reasoned that free speech is "indispensable
to the discovery and spread of political truth."44a 5 Brandeis in Whitney,
like Pound and Chafee before him, also identified various individual
interests in free speech, 446 yet he followed his scholarly predecessors
in considering the social interest in speech to be even more important.
Each citizen's freedom of expression, he claimed in Gilbert, is a duty
as well as a right, "for its exercise is more important to the Nation
than it is to himself. '447 In addition, Brandeis maintained, as had
most of the scholars, that repression of speech is "hazardous" and
"menaces stable government. '44
As they adopted libertarian values, Holmes and Brandeis faced the
difficult problem of dealing with the prewar judicial hostility to free
speech and its continuation in their own Espionage Act decisions.
Trapped in a tradition from which they wanted to escape, but re-
luctant to acknowledge that tradition or their own role in it, they
followed the lead provided by Chafee's article.
440. 252 U.S. 239, 269 (1920).
441. 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927).
442. 252 U.S. 239, 273 (1920).
443. 254 U.S. 325, 338 (1920).
444. Chafee-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, at 956-57; see p. 587
supra (quoting from paragraph).
445. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In Gilbert, Brandeis also re-
ferred to the "conquest of error by truth." 254 U.S. 325, 338 (1920).
446. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
447. 254 U.S. 325, 338 (1920). In Whitney, Brandeis asserted, on behalf of the framers,
that "public discussion is a public duty." 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
448. 274 U.S. at 375.
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Holmes, who met Chafee between Schenck and Abrams,449 and
Brandeis, who cited Chafee repeatedly in his opinions, 450 recognized
the strategic possibilities of Chafee's misconstruction of "clear and
present danger." They accepted as their own the libertarian meaning
Chafee erroneously read into those words, and thus were able, be-
ginning with Abrams, to reject the bad tendency theory and neglect
the prewar cases while claiming fidelity to precedent. 45' Throughout
the 1920s, Holmes and Brandeis elevated "clear and present danger"
to constitutional significance and clung to it as the doctrinal peg
for the libertarian values it did not express when Holmes first used
the phrase in Schenck.
Conclusion
As the Supreme Court majority itself began to accept a more liber-
tarian interpretation of the First Amendment, Chafee's views, rein-
449. Harold Laski, who knew both Holmes and Chafee, arranged for them to meet
during the summer of 1919. Laski had already given Holmes a copy of Chafee's article
and looked forward to a good "fight." Letter from Harold Laski to Zechariah Chafee,
Jr. (July 23, 1919) (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 14, Folder 15, Harvard Law School
Library). Referring to his conversation with Holmes, Chafee wrote, "It is clear from the
way Justice Holmes talks that if he had been on the jury in the Debs case he would have
voted for acquittal." Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Judge Charles F. Amidon
(Sept. 30, 1919) (Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 4, Folder 1, Harvard Law School
Library). Holmes subsequently wrote that Chafee had "seemed unusually pleasant and
intelligent." Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Sir Frederick Pollock (June
21, 1920), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 45 (M. Howe ed. 1941). He also described Chafee
-Freedom of Speech in War Time, supra note 3, as "first rate." Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Harold Laski (Dec. 17, 1920), in 1 HOLMEs-LAsKi L=rnfs 297
(M. Howe ed. 1953).
450. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 n.3, 377 nA (1927); United
States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 431
n.1, 433 n.1 (1921); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 486 (1920). While working on
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), Brandeis' law clerk, Dean Acheson, corresponded
with Chafee and obtained page proofs of chapter two of Chafee's Freedom of Speech.
Letter from Zechariah Chafee, Jr., to Dean Acheson (Nov. 20, 1920) (L.D. Brandeis Papers,
Box 5, Folder 12, Harvard Law School Library). Brandeis' dissent in Gilbert largely in-
corporated from Chafee's letter to Acheson the reasoning, conclusions, and authorities
dealing with the issues of federal preemption of state law and protection of freedom of
speech through the Fourteenth Amendment. 254 U.S. at 342-43. In preparing his opinion
in Whitney, Brandeis took extensive notes on Freedom of Speech. See Handwritten notes
(L.D. Brandeis Papers, Box 44, Folder 5, Harvard Law School Library). Brandeis, en-
closing a copy of this opinion, wrote Chafee that he "will see how much I have borrowed
from you." Letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (May 21, 1927)
(Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Papers, Box 4, Folder 4, Harvard Law School Library).
451. Holmes took care in Abrams to point out that "I never have seen an) reason to
doubt that the questions of law that alone were before this Court in the cases of
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs . . . were rightly decided." Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 627 (1919). In Gitlow, he claimed that the majority "departed from" the "clear
and present danger" test in Abrams. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925).
Brandeis, in accepting "clear and present danger" as a constitutional standard in his
first dissent, called it "a rule of reason," Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482
(1920); in Whitney, he acknowledged that this rule had not yet been clearly defined.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374 (1927).
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forced by the additional books and articles he published over more
than three decades,452 achieved even greater prominence. Although
several recent scholars have successfully refuted the meaning attrib-
uted by Chafee to the "clear and present danger" language in Schenck,
his work is still considered the initial important analysis of the First
Amendment. Professors and judges have generally ignored the schol-
arship on which Chafee himself had relied, and have accepted un-
critically his misrepresentation of the judicial tradition before World
War One. As a result, the earlier cases and scholars are essentially
unknown.
Many of the libertarian views of the prewar scholars, inherited in-
directly through Chafee, have now received judicial acceptance. The
prewar cases, on the other hand, have little continuing impact be-
cause the ideology behind them has been replaced by a vastly increased
judicial sensitivity to First Amendment values. 453 But whatever their
current influence, these earlier scholars and cases are important. The
prewar tradition demonstrates that consideration of the meaning of
the First Amendment did not end with Hamilton and Jefferson, only
to be resumed over a century later by Hand, Chafee, Holmes, and
Brandeis. Developments in the generation before World War One
not only formed part of the intellectual history of the First Amend-
ment; they contributed significantly to the elaboration of judicial
doctrine in the crucial years following the war.
452. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY (1956); Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES (1941); Z. CHAFEE, THE INQUIRING MIND (1928); Chafee, Book Review,
62 HARV. L. Rav. 891 (1949) (reviewing Meiklejohn's Free Speech And Its Relation to
Self-Government).
453. Some of these cases have been explicitly or effectively overruled by the Supreme
Court. See notes 64, 83, 97, 159, 169, 170, 179, 208 & 272 supra. A few of them, however,
continue to be discussed in recent Supreme Court decisions. In fact, the occasions when
prewar cases are now relied on provides a useful index of the extent to which the modern
Court has decided not to adopt a more libertarian interpretation of the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) (upholding disenfranchisement of
ex-felons; citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,
28 n.10 (1973) (establishing "contemporary community standards" as test of obscenity;
citing Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915), for proposition that test not too vague
for criminal law); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (sustaining exclusion of
Belgian Marxist professor invited to visit various American universities; citing Turner
v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904), among other authorities, for proposition that unadmitted,
nonresident alien has no constitutional right to enter United States); Communist Party
of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 n.39 (1961) (up-
holding registration requirement for "Communist-action organization"; citing Lewis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913)); see note 198 supra (discussing Hatch Act
cases that cite Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882)); cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 418-20 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907),
to support constitutionality of conviction for attaching peace symbol to American flag).
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